Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and Experiments by Strahilevitz, Lior & Ben-Shahar, Omri
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2017
Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and
Experiments
Lior Strahilevitz
Omri Ben-Shahar
Follow this and additional works at: https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lior Strahilevitz & Omri Ben-Shahar, "Interpreting Contracts via Surveys and Experiments," 92 New York University Law Review
1753 (2017).
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 4 Side A      12/19/2017   13:54:27
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 4 Side A      12/19/2017   13:54:27
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 1 18-DEC-17 7:55
ARTICLES
INTERPRETING CONTRACTS VIA
SURVEYS AND EXPERIMENTS
OMRI BEN-SHAHAR† & LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ‡
Interpreting the language of contracts may be the most common and least satisfac-
tory task courts perform in contract disputes. This Article proposes to take much of
this task out of the hands of lawyers and judges, entrusting it instead to the public.
The Article develops and tests a novel regime—the “survey interpretation
method”—in which interpretation disputes are resolved through large surveys of
representative respondents, by choosing the meaning that a majority supports. This
Article demonstrates the rich potential for this method to examine variations of
contractual language that could have made an intended meaning clearer. A similar
survey regime has been applied successfully in trademark and unfair competition
law for decades to interpret precontractual messages, and this Article shows how it
could be extended to interpret contractual texts. The Article focuses on the interpre-
tation of consumer contracts as the primary application of the proposed method,
but demonstrates how the method could also apply to contracts between sophisti-
cated parties. To demonstrate the technique, this Article applies the survey interpre-
tation method to five real cases in which courts struggled to interpret contracts. It
then provides normative, pragmatic, and doctrinal support for the proposed
regime.
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INTRODUCTION
During the first half of the last century, plaintiffs seeking to prove
trademark infringement knew what they had to do. The lynchpin of
trademark litigation is consumer confusion, so a plaintiff seeking to
establish such likelihood of confusion would call witnesses. Here is a
consumer from Utah who will testify that the defendant’s mark is con-
fusingly similar to the plaintiff’s mark, which she knows and trusts.
Here is a witness from Florida who will attest to the same effect. I
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have a shopper from Delaware who will describe buying the defen-
dant’s product by mistake, thinking it to be the plaintiff’s product.
And another from California. Witnesses would be marched in from all
over. Everyone understood that the plaintiff (and defendant) are
cherry-picking consumers to testify for or against confusion.
Then, in 1928, an enterprising lawyer in Delaware tried some-
thing novel. Instead of parading a couple dozen witnesses to testify, he
brought in only one: an expert witness. The expert had surveyed hun-
dreds of consumers about whether they were confused, producing an
elegant study that generalized how average consumers responded to
particular advertising messages and how many of them were confused
by similar rival products. The court was not impressed, excluding the
expert testimony as inadmissible hearsay. It insisted that it could only
accept evidence from consumers testifying in open court.1 Other
courts followed suit.2
But in the decades that followed, federal courts began to reverse
course.3 They came to recognize that expert witnesses of the sort
called by the Delaware lawyer provided a much more reliable basis
for determining whether two messages were likely to be confused with
each other.4 They also came to realize that the fact that a handful of
consumers would testify in court about having been deceived should
not be dispositive.5 By the early 1960s, judicial opposition to consumer
survey evidence had crumbled.6 Such evidence is now de rigueur in
trademark and false advertising litigation.7
When it comes to contract interpretation, U.S. law may as well be
stuck in 1928. The question of what a consumer contract means and
1 Elgin Nat. Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376, 376–78 (D. Del. 1928).
2 DuPont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 6 F. Supp. 859, 884–85 (E.D.N.Y.
1934), modified on other grounds, 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1936).
3 See, e.g., United States v. 88 Cases, More or Less, Containing Bireley’s Orange
Beverage, 187 F.2d 967, 974 (3d. Cir. 1951) (holding that a survey asking consumers what
they believed the appellant’s product contained did not constitute hearsay because it was
not offered for the truth of the matter asserted, and allowing the survey to be admitted as
evidence); see also Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 224–25 (2d Cir. 1999)
(summarizing the development of the case law).
4 See Beverly W. Pattishall, Reaction Test Evidence in Trade Identity Cases, 49
TRADEMARK REP. 145, 150–51, 150 n.22 (1959).
5 Id. at 148–49, 149 n.16.
6 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 680–82 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(stating that “[a]lthough courts were at first reluctant to accept survey evidence or to give it
weight, the more recent trend is clearly contrary”).
7 Schering Corp., 189 F.3d at 225 (acknowledging that surveys are “routinely admitted
in trademark and false advertising cases” (citing Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-
P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1043 (2d Cir. 1992); PPX Enters., Inc. v. Audiofidelity Enters.,
Inc., 818 F.2d 266, 271 (2d Cir. 1987); Nestle Co. v. Chester’s Mkt., Inc., 571 F. Supp. 763,
769–70, 773–75 (D. Conn. 1983))).
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what expectations it arouses among consumers is not determined
based on how hundreds or thousands of surveyed representative con-
sumers actually interpret the language at issue. Not even when there is
a consensus among the respondents. Instead, contractual meaning is
determined based on canons of interpretation, wispy policy argu-
ments, judicial conjectures about what interpretations make business
sense, or dictionaries. And when a court interprets a merchant con-
tract based on the text’s dominant usage in trade, the method for
finding the trade usage is apt to be anachronistic. A handful of people
involved in the industry or employed by the parties will be flown in to
testify. Contract interpretation does not have to be that way. In this
Article, we offer a better alternative.
Interpreting the language of contracts may be the most common
and least satisfactory task courts perform in contract disputes. This
Article proposes to take much of this task out of the hands of lawyers
and judges, entrusting it instead to the relevant public. It develops and
tests a novel regime—the “survey interpretation method”—in which
interpretation disputes are resolved through surveys of representative
populations, and ambiguity is measured or alleviated through the use
of randomized experiments.
We approach this project with some sense of urgency. Contract
interpretation is a body of law in dire need of new thinking. First, it is
notoriously inconsistent. Different jurisdictions apply radically dif-
ferent approaches on the most fundamental question: What evidence
should courts admit to inform their interpretation of contractual lan-
guage? New York and California present two polar extremes, with the
former admitting perhaps too little and the latter surely too much.8
And within state jurisdictions, courts are insubordinate. For example,
the Illinois Supreme Court has instructed lower courts to consider
only certain information, but to no avail.9
8 Compare Mitchill v. Lath, 160 N.E. 646, 549–50 (N.Y. 1928) (Lehman, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the application of New York’s parol evidence rule is too restrictive), with
Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th Cir. 1988) (arguing that
California’s erosion of the parol evidence rule is too permissive).
9 Compare Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ill. 1999)
(reaffirming a narrow parol evidence rule), with Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 437 F.2d 231,
235 (7th Cir. 1971) (finding that even if the decision cannot be harmonized with “holdings
of the various Illinois cases involving the parol evidence rule,” extrinsic evidence should
always be admissible to determine the meaning of an integrated agreement). A
practitioner’s treatise concludes that “despite the Illinois Supreme Court’s consistent
reaffirmation of the four-corners test . . . , the Illinois appellate courts remain split on the
use of those approaches.” Christofer R. Dunsing & Thomas R. Stilp, The Parol Evidence
Rule and Contract Interpretation, in CONTRACT LAW § 11.15 (Karen F. Botterud ed., 2016
ed.).
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Second, contract interpretation law is in trouble because it is
overly complex. Courts employ a mishmash of conflicting methodolo-
gies—including textualism, formalism, purposivism, and function-
alism—to elicit the meaning of texts.10 They rely on various policy
goals—accuracy, reduction of transaction and litigation costs,
improved drafting, and rewarding information exchange—to expand
or shrink the scope of their contextual inquiry.11 And they fall back on
archaic canons of interpretation that have essentially nothing to do
with the way people read prose.12
Third, and largely due to its inconsistency and complexity, con-
tract interpretation is unpredictable. Because the amount of evidence
and the nature of justifications that courts marshal to interpret the
language is so temperamental, it is hard for contracting parties to
anticipate the litigated outcome of their contracts. Contracting in the
shadow of this interpretive risk becomes needlessly costly. In their
(sometimes futile) effort to reduce this risk, drafters of contracts are
writing longer and longer documents, further divorcing legal and lay
meanings.13 It is thus not surprising that, reading a lengthy boilerplate,
only nine percent of consumers understood that their contract had a
legally enforceable mandatory arbitration clause.14
Interpretation risk is not the only cost imposed on parties by the
present state of contract interpretation doctrine. Litigation itself has
become expensive, with parties sometimes spending many years and
10 See Alexander Volokh, Choosing Interpretive Methods: A Positive Theory of Judges
and Everyone Else, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 769, 779–80 (2008) (giving examples of the same
provision being interpreted differently under the influence of different interpretive
methods).
11 See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 439–41 (4th ed. 2004); Keith A.
Rowley, Contract Construction and Interpretation: From the “Four Corners” to Parol
Evidence (and Everything in Between), 69 MISS. L.J. 73 (1999) (discussing a number of
rules of contract interpretation).
12 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Miranda, 507 S.E.2d 789, 793 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (describing
a Georgia rule that any ambiguity should be interpreted against foreclosures); Rogers v.
Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 520 N.W.2d 614, 617 (S.D. 1994) (discussing the rule of the last
antecedent used to interpret modifier words in contracts). See generally FARNSWORTH,
supra note 11, at 456–61 (explaining the major rules used by judges to interpret contractual
language); Edwin W. Patterson, The Interpretation and Construction of Contracts, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 833 (1964) (discussing a number of rules of contractual interpretation).
13 Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L.
REV. 1173, 1226 (1983) (predicting that “the standard [contract] forms—because they are
drafted to cover many such contingencies—are likely to be long and complex”). See
generally, OMRI BEN-SHAHAR & CARL E. SCHNEIDER, MORE THAN YOU WANTED TO
KNOW: THE FAILURE OF MANDATED DISCLOSURE 18–23 (2014) (describing the length of
standard form contracts).
14 Jeff Sovern et al., “Whimsy Little Contracts” with Unexpected Consequences: An
Empirical Analysis of Consumer Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV.
1, 47 (2015).
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millions of dollars fighting—not to persuade juries, but to convince
judges what evidence to admit and what procedures to follow in inter-
preting the contract.15 And these problems have only been exacer-
bated in the digital era as contracts have grown longer.
The unhappy state of interpretation doctrine in contract law does
not diminish its practical importance. As mass-market contracts are
growing longer and more numerous, they also boldly override entire
codes of default rules.16 Contracts are assuming a more prominent
role in regulating market transactions,17 the transactions are becoming
increasingly complicated, and their interpretation is becoming a battle
of greater stakes.
This paradoxical combination—an increasingly archaic doctrine
called upon to resolve increasingly important issues—suggests that it
is perhaps time for a major new move. This Article proposes such a
move: outsourcing the interpretation task by handing it over to a sim-
pler, more predictable, and arguably cheaper process. Instead of
asking judges and juries to interpret contracts, the meaning of dis-
puted contractual clauses should be determined by polling a large rep-
resentative sample of disinterested respondents. Let majorities of
survey respondents decide. For consumer contracts (our primary focus
in this Article), that entails polling a representative sample of con-
sumers. For contracts involving sophisticated parties, we propose sur-
veying dozens of disinterested participants in the relevant industry
when feasible.
The survey interpretation method might appear to be a radical
departure from the procedures governing existing contract litigation.
In presenting this method as a practical alternative to court- and
canon-based interpretation, we ground it on several supporting pillars.
As our prologue revealed, a very similar method is widely used with
satisfactory results in resolving interpretation disputes over the
meaning of advertising messages and descriptions of products—texts
closely related to contracts.18 The opposing parties in such cases (pri-
15 See, e.g., TruServ Corp. v. Morgan’s Tool & Supply Co., 39 A.3d 253, 256, 265 (Pa.
2012) (reversing and remanding for new proceedings in a breach of contract action that
had been pending for twelve and a half years); S’holder Representative Servs., LLC v.
Airbus Ams., Inc., 791 S.E.2d 724, 727 (Va. 2016) (involving the breach of a merger
agreement in which the court awarded the prevailing party attorney’s fees of nearly $3.9
million).
16 MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW 182–85 (2013) (explaining how mass-market contracts diverge from
default contract rules by introducing provisions such as choice of forum clauses, warranty
disclaimers, and others).
17 Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV.
883 (2014).
18 See Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 1999).
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marily in trademark and unfair competition disputes) are expected to
produce surveys about the meaning that consumers assign to these
messages and the likelihood that consumers will be confused by
various aspects of these communications. When such surveys are done
well, courts devotedly rely on them. We argue that if the survey
method is deemed reliable in interpreting precontractual statements
and communications, then they ought to be equally attractive in inter-
preting contractual communications—namely, the promises made in
the contract.
While the use of consumer surveys in trademark law provides
important cross-substantive inspiration for our proposal, we rely on
three other types of support to make the case for the survey interpre-
tation method: pragmatic, normative, and doctrinal. The core prag-
matic argument is that interpretation surveys are practical and
reliable. While we defer some of the nitty-gritty survey design ques-
tions, we nevertheless tackle several key methodological issues. We
bolster the pragmatic argument by running a pilot study applying the
survey method to resolve actual interpretation disputes. Specifically,
we picked several real cases in which courts struggled to interpret con-
tracts coherently, and conducted large-scale surveys asking lay respon-
dents to interpret the same language. We were able to compare the
results of the traditional and the survey methodologies, and highlight
the attractive features of the latter in this Article. We also used the
survey method to test whether refinements in the contract language
shown to respondents elicit different majority interpretations. We did
this to identify potential biases of respondents, and also to compare
the contractual text with variations that might improve its clarity. Such
results—and especially the proven existence of (unused) clearer lan-
guage—provide a more rigorous and first-of-its-kind foundation for
“whose meaning prevails” doctrines like contra proferentem and
mutual mistake.
The second form of support is normative. The survey method
advances a particular conception of meaning: attaching to contracts
the understanding assigned by those for whom they are written.
Surveys that poll a sample of the intended audience capture that
meaning more accurately than a judge’s imagination. This goal is
achieved when contract language aimed at laypeople (like consumers
and most employees) is interpreted by surveys of the general popula-
tion, and contracts aimed at particular sectors (like specialists,
merchants, and investors) are interpreted by surveys of sector mem-
bers. In so doing, our methodology takes seriously the black letter
doctrine that contract formation requires an objective “meeting of the
minds,” and uses hard data as evidence of what the parties to the con-
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 7 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 7 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 8 18-DEC-17 7:55
1760 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1753
tract actually expected (or would have expected had they read the
text).19 By creating a reliable mechanism to evaluate the objective
meaning, courts can be more certain that the terms they are enforcing
are the ones to which both parties actually would have assented.
Interpretation via surveys would reduce the opportunity for
courts to engage in “normative interpretation”—choosing interpreta-
tions that advance other goals. It would also promote important quali-
ties. One such quality is the incentive to draft short, simple, and
widely understandable contractual text ex ante in order to reduce the
risk of misinterpretation. Another quality is low litigation cost. In the
era of online panels, the cost of resolving interpretation disputes
through surveys is potentially far lower than the cost of the alterna-
tive—with lawyers racking up billable hours to canvass precedents,
canons, and context to sway trial courts. Finally, survey-interpreted
consumer contracts are predictable, because they can be pretested.
This also allows for more flexibility because contracting parties no
longer have to stick with old, previously interpreted boilerplates to
secure a known meaning.
The third and last defense of the survey interpretation method is
doctrinal. Here, we make two separate arguments. One argument is
conceptual. While the survey interpretation method is a procedural
innovation, we argue that it is substantively consistent with some
existing law. We show that the method shares the premises and foun-
dations of longstanding contract and evidence doctrines.
Another doctrinal argument is founded on the power of con-
tracting parties to customize litigation procedures. If the existing law
of contract interpretation is just a default rule, parties could opt out of
court-based interpretation and opt into the survey interpretation
method. Not just could; they should (recall the aforementioned list of
desirable effects). To reduce ex post battles of surveys, the parties
could specify an exclusive survey procedure they expect the court to
recognize and may even select the survey company in advance. This
would also enable the parties to put the language of the contract to
the test, ex ante. Businesses already field test every aspect of their
products before releasing them to the public. It would be straightfor-
ward to field test their consumer contract language as well.
In developing the case for the survey interpretation method, this
Article is structured as follows. Part I states the problem: Existing
contract interpretation law is inconsistent and complex, and it gener-
19 See Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning
of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1231–32 (2006) (bemoaning the trend of treating the
meeting of the minds as a legal fiction).
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ates too much litigation at too high a cost. Part II introduces the solu-
tion, the survey interpretation method, and shows how a similar
approach has worked in trademark litigation. Parts III, IV, and V pre-
sent the three types of supporting arguments for the proposed
method—pragmatic, normative, and doctrinal. Finally, Part VI con-
cludes with further extensions and remarks.
I
THE UNEASY PROCESS OF CONTRACT INTERPRETATION
[I]nterpretation of the contract is no formal or mechanical task. On
the contrary, it is one of the most intractable tasks which a court has
to face, and it is not made easier by the inadequacy of the rules
which the courts have forged to assist them.
— P.S. Atiyah20
We begin by identifying the problem: Existing interpretation doc-
trines are difficult to apply and lead to costly litigation with unpredict-
able outcomes. To demonstrate this we focus on the leading exemplar
of the existing interpretation method: the plain meaning rule. This is
the idea that contractual text has to be interpreted according to its
most straightforward meaning. Our interest is not so much in the sub-
stance of the plain meaning test, but in the process of its implementa-
tion—how courts go about figuring out the plain meaning of
contractual terms. We show that the process is plagued by method-
ological complexity and murkiness. This brief discussion will set the
stage for the main contribution of this Article, which begins in Part II,
exploring a novel substitute for the prevailing approach.
A. Contract Interpretation and the Ambiguity Test
The basic question a court asks in interpreting the meaning of
contractual language is how people entering such a contract under-
stand it—what expectations this language evokes among the parties.21
“The cardinal rule in the interpretation of contracts is to ascertain the
intention of the parties. To this rule all others are subordinate.”22
Words, though, rarely have singular meaning. No matter how
carefully drafted, the reasonable understanding of a word or phrase
often depends on the circumstances in which it was used when the
contract was made. A buyer and seller may agree on the sale of
“Grade A chicken,” but does that mean only fresh young broilers, or
20 P.S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 195 (5th ed. 1995).
21 FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 445–52.
22 City of Grosse Point Park v. Mich. Mun. Liab. & Prop. Pool, 702 N.W.2d 106, 113
(Mich. 2005) (quoting McIntosh v. Groomes, 198 N.W. 954 (Mich. 1924)).
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also stewing chicken?23 An airplane insurance contract may stipulate
that it covers only accidents occurring “within the United States and
its territories,” but does this exclude a plane crashing in international
waters while en route from Miami to Puerto Rico?24
Contractual disputes regularly arise over the meaning of a provi-
sion that is capable of being reasonably understood in more than one
way. A judge often has to decide, as a matter of law (reviewable by an
appellate court), whether the term is indeed susceptible to such dis-
pute over meaning. If it is, its interpretation becomes a question of
fact to be resolved via trial, where the multitude of surrounding cir-
cumstances including precontractual communications, drafting his-
tory, evidence about goals the parties had under the contract, past and
concurrent dealings, and trade norms may be presented.
The essence of the plain meaning rule is in guiding the judge
making this initial determination—whether a term is ambiguous.
Should the judge go beyond the dictionary meaning of contract text
and examine, in addition, the context in which the language was used
to determine whether more than one meaning is plausible? How much
of the potential evidentiary thicket may the judge invoke, or even con-
sider, in making this determination?
Courts are hopelessly split along the continuum between two
polar approaches to this fundamental dilemma. At one end is the
narrow “textual” approach of traditional common law—sometimes
known as the “four corners test”25—requiring the judge to ignore
extrinsic evidence and refer only to the text in deciding whether ambi-
guity exists. This formalistic approach presumably reduces litigation,
but it also causes courts to sometimes enforce bargains that the parties
never intended. At the other end is the more expansive “contextual”
approach of the Second Restatement and the Uniform Commercial
Code, instructing the judge to consider interpretations based on at
least some surrounding circumstances for the purpose of determining
whether the term is ambiguous.26 This fact-intensive approach
23 Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 117
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
24 Vargas v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 651 F.2d 838, 839 (2d Cir. 1981).
25 Saddler v. Nat’l Bank of Bloomington, 85 N.E.2d 733, 740 (Ill. 1949); Stewart v.
McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 661 (Pa. 1982); Treemont, Inc. v. Hawley, 886 P.2d 589, 592–93
(Wyo. 1994).
26 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 212–216 (AM. LAW INST. 1981); U.C.C.
§ 2-202 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977); see, e.g., Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v.
G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co., 442 P.2d 641, 644 (Cal. 1968) (holding that the test
whether extrinsic evidence should be admissible is whether the evidence is “relevant to
prove a meaning to which the language of the instrument is reasonably susceptible”).
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improves accuracy, but at the cost of lengthier and more expensive
litigation.
The same question—what information to rely on when deter-
mining whether the meaning of a term is ambiguous—arises in the
application of other interpretation doctrines as well. One example is
the parol evidence rule, which prevents a party from introducing
extrinsic evidence of prior understandings when a written contract
integrates the entire agreement.27 As with the plain meaning rule, the
judge has to decide whether to admit extrinsic evidence.28 Likewise,
the doctrine of reasonable expectations allows the court to bridge the
perfunctory letter of the contract and its spirit by enforcing a meaning
consistent with the intentions of the parties as evidenced by sur-
rounding circumstances.29 In most states, courts apply such expansive
interpretation only after determining that the text itself is ambiguous
and susceptible to this meaning.30 These courts face the same method-
ological challenge: Is a term ambiguous? How much extrinsic evi-
dence should be employed in determining whether it is?
B. The Challenges of Applying the Interpretation Doctrine
The legal framework that governs the interpretive task is concen-
trated around the ambiguity test. The court’s role is to determine
whether a term is sufficiently clear and has, as a matter of law, only
one reasonable meaning.
The ambiguity test is perhaps the most practically important tool
that courts adjudicating contracts disputes are asked to use, but it is
also the least theoretically satisfying. This mismatch between the test’s
widespread usage and its impoverished theoretical underpinnings are
in part due to the idiosyncratic nature of the interpretation enterprise.
Determining whether a term is ambiguous is a task for which prior
resolution of earlier cases provides limited, if any, guidance. Even if
the same language was used previously, it was wrapped within dif-
ferent overall text, used among different parties at a different time,
and illuminated by different (alleged) contextual clues. Interpretation
is a task that requires judges to apply intuition and common sense,
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 213 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
28 FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 418–22.
29 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1981); see, e.g., C
& J Fertilizer, Inc. v. Allied Mut. Ins. Co., 227 N.W.2d 169, 176 (Iowa 1975) (rejecting the
plain meaning rule in favor of the reasonable expectations test).
30 Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations in Insurance Law
After Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 827–28 (1990). See also RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 3(2) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft 2017)
(providing that insurance policies are to be interpreted according to their plain meaning).
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 9 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 9 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 12 18-DEC-17 7:55
1764 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1753
namely mental processes that vary with the judges’ backgrounds and
experiences.31
The ambiguity test leads to ad hoc and unsatisfactory results for
reasons that extend beyond the idiosyncrasies of cases or judges. The
most perplexing challenge under this test is to define boundaries of
permissible extrinsic evidence. How much information on surrounding
circumstances ought to be utilized in determining whether the text is
ambiguous? The extreme positions—“no extrinsic information” or
“all extrinsic information”—are neither possible nor desirable. Even
rigid textual approaches invoke some assumptions and experience
that are not explicitly stated in the text—it is impossible and often silly
to understand language “in a vacuum,”32 without a contextual base-
line. For example, some extrinsic information is intuitively invoked to
know that “Grade A chicken” refers to supply chain standards and
not to the hygiene score of a Chick-fil-A outlet. And conversely, the
entire distinction between questions of law and those of fact would
collapse, and the reliability of written contracts would subside, if
written terms were never litigation-proof and if the court, at the pre-
trial stage, was required to examine all extrinsic evidence.
In theory, in order to determine how much information to admit
in resolving the ambiguity test, the court can balance the cost and ben-
efit of the marginal bit of evidence. Additional extrinsic data should
be allowed only if the cost of evaluating it (lengthier proceedings) is
less than the expected benefit (greater accuracy). But courts do not
have the tools to perform this tradeoff, particularly because they are
ill-equipped to ascertain the benefit of information prior to its acquisi-
tion. A party may argue that the meaning of “Grade A chicken” can
only be established by evidence of trade usage, but it is not clear until
such evidence is brought whether it would indeed shed light on the
meaning. The value of information is hard to assess until it is acquired,
by which time it is too late to conclude that it is not worth the cost.
This absence of clear criteria—which information to admit to
resolve the ambiguity test—has led to several problematic features of
existing law. First, courts are hopelessly split, even within jurisdictions,
about the proper role of extrinsic evidence and the proper scope of
the plain meaning rule. For example, while the Illinois Supreme Court
has repeatedly reaffirmed the strict approach of the four corners
31 See 3 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 535 (rev. ed. 1960) (“It is
true that when a judge reads the words of a contract he may jump to the instant and
confident opinion that they have but one reasonable meaning and that he knows what it
is.”).
32 Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 437 F.2d 231, 234 (7th Cir. 1971).
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test,33 lower courts often follow a more lenient and contextual
approach, with occasional approval from the Seventh Circuit.34 One
cannot shake the cynical impression that the choice of approach—
including more versus less extrinsic information to determine whether
the language is susceptible to more than one meaning—is merely a
label placed on the conclusion of the interpretive inquiry rather than a
functional test to help resolve it.
The murkiness of the information test forces courts ill-equipped
to make the cost/benefit tradeoffs to resort to arbitrary categorical
classifications. For example, many courts distinguish between evi-
dence of “surrounding circumstances” (permitted) versus evidence of
“prior negotiations” (prohibited).35 These classifications lead courts to
make contradictory statements, sometimes in the same decision—like
the following language from New York’s highest court: Ambiguity “is
determined by looking within the four corners of the document, not to
outside sources,” but in “deciding whether an agreement is ambiguous
courts ‘should . . . consider the relation of the parties and the circum-
stances under which it was executed.’”36
The difficulty in applying the ambiguity test is rooted in a funda-
mental and unresolved distinction that underlies the entire interpre-
tive methodology—is interpretation a question of law or a question of
fact? Any attempt to divide the labor between law/fact and judge/jury
is constricting the process with an all-or-nothing choice that poorly fits
the underlying challenges—namely, what intermediate amount of
information is optimal in interpreting the contract, and what expertise
is needed to evaluate this information? The confusion over the law/
fact boundary runs deep in contract law. The Restatement of Con-
tracts endorses an intermediate solution—while it classifies interpreta-
tion as a “question of law,” it also stipulates that it ought to be
33 See, e.g., Gallagher v. Lenart, 874 N.E.2d 43, 63 (Ill. 2007) (affirming appellate court
decision fully giving effect to straightforward language in a workers’ compensation
settlement contract); Air Safety, Inc. v. Teachers Realty Corp., 706 N.E.2d 882, 884 (Ill.
1999) (holding that a court must look at the language of the contract alone).
34 See Dunsing & Stilp, supra note 9, §§ 11.5, 11.17 (describing the approaches taken by
Illinois lower courts and the Seventh Circuit to the admission of extrinsic evidence).
35 FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 464; see also Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co. v. CSX Transp.,
42 F.3d 1125, 1129 (7th Cir. 1994); W.W.W. Assocs. v. Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642
(N.Y. 1990); Steuart v. McChesney, 444 A.2d 659, 663 (Pa. 1982); Berg v. Hudesman, 801
P.2d 222, 230 (Wash. 1990); David E. Pierce, Defining the Role of Industry Custom and
Usage in Oil and Gas Litigation, 57 S.M.U. L. REV. 387, 398 (2004) (stating that “many
courts would exclude prior negotiation evidence under the plain meaning rule” (internal
quotations omitted)).
36 Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180 (N.Y. 1995); see also Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d at
642 (“Evidence outside the four corners of the document as to what was really intended
but unstated or misstated is generally inadmissible to add to or vary the writing.”).
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determined by the “trier of fact” when the meaning depends on the
credibility of, or the choice among reasonable inferences from,
extrinsic evidence.37 But courts are far from uniform in their treat-
ment of this distinction.38
All this uncertainty increases litigation costs. In requiring the
judge to make an upfront determination about whether a contractual
term is ambiguous, the present methodology induces the parties to
spend significant resources to sway the judge that their preferred
interpretation is at least plausible to move beyond summary proceed-
ings. Contract disputes are costly, and these costs distort the outcomes
by pressuring a party to settle in order to avoid lengthy and unpredict-
able litigation. These costs also turn the rationale of the plain meaning
rule on its head. Recall that the primary justification for a textual
approach is the saving of litigation costs involved in reviewing all the
extrinsic evidence. But the battle over the ambiguity test could cost
just as much. A plain meaning rule applied strictly might reduce litiga-
tion costs. Yet it does not appear that any U.S. jurisdiction has a sound
basis for characterizing its contract law as applying the plain meaning
rule in that way.
II
THE SURVEY INTERPRETATION METHOD
In Part I we described the problem. We now present the solution:
a novel approach to the interpretation of contracts. To determine the
meaning of a text, courts ought to rely on surveys. A survey would ask
a pool of respondents, who resemble the contracting parties, what
meaning they assign to the language. If the respondents are about
evenly split, the term should be regarded as ambiguous. But if one
meaning garners noticeably greater support among the survey respon-
dents, it presumptively ought to prevail.
There are flickers of receptivity to this idea in contract doctrine.
We discuss them in Part V. A couple of law review articles have
flagged the idea of a more empirically inclined approach to contract
interpretation.39 And as then-Judge Sotomayor has noted, while the
37 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 212(2) & cmt. d. (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
38 FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 477–78 (“The traditional view is that interpretation
is generally for the judge. . . . Some courts, however, have shown greater willingness to
send questions of interpretation to the jury.”).
39 The paper that comes closest to advancing the argument we make here is Michelle
Boardman, Insuring Understanding: The Tested Language Defense, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1075
(2010). Boardman’s argument is limited to the insurance contract context, but she was
apparently the first scholar to argue that when an insurance company has pre-tested
insurance policy boilerplate by having disinterested consumers read it, the company could
invoke data about how respondents understood the language as a defense in subsequent
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use of surveys is most widespread in trademark litigation, surveys
have been admitted for other limited purposes in cases involving the
Fair Housing Act, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Equal Educa-
tional Opportunities Act.40 But the primary inspiration for the use of
the survey method to interpret contracts comes from trademark and
unfair competition law.
Contractual terms are one way in which parties communicate
their promises. Another channel of communication is precontractual
“marketing”—the representations that a party makes to its potential
contractual counterparts through advertising, branding, and various
statements and disclosures. In adjudicating the meaning of these com-
munications and the expectations they convey to their recipients,
courts have long relied on surveys.41 In a typical trademark infringe-
litigation alleging that the policy was ambiguous. Id. at 1099–103; see also Eric A. Zacks,
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 211: Unfulfilled Expectations and the Future of
Modern Standardized Consumer Contracts, 7 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 733, 792 (2016)
(noting the appeal of empirical approaches to contract interpretation). Another strand of
the literature advocated the use of consumer surveys in the design of contract disclosures
and default rules. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in
Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014) (advocating empirical testing to
identify surprising and problematic provisions in standard form contracts, against which
consumers ought to be warned); Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing
Default Rules and Disclosure with Big Data, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1417, 1419–20 (2014)
(advocating the use of surveys to identify the majoritarian preferences for the design of
granular default rules). Finally, survey methods have been used to measure consumers’
awareness of various contractual features. See, e.g., Ann Morales Olazabal et al., Frequent
Flyer Programs: Empirically Assessing Consumers’ Reasonable Expectations, 51 AM. BUS.
L.J. 175, 248 (2014) (demonstrating a contrast between consumer expectations under
frequent flyer programs and the actual contract terms); Lawrence Solan et al., False
Consensus Bias in Contract Interpretation, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1268 (2008) (comparing the
presence of decisional biases among lay respondents and judges). A survey method of
interpretation was also proposed recently in a German article, Alexander Sto¨hr,
Determining Transparency Under Section 307(1)(2) Civil Code: The Case for an Empirical
Approach, 216 ARCHIV FU¨R DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS 558 (2016) (in German). But see
Hanjo Hamann & Leonard Hoeft, An Empirical Approach to Civil Law: Adding Realism
and Methodological Rigor to Legal Analysis?, 217 ARCHIV FU¨R DIE CIVILISTISCHE PRAXIS
(forthcoming 2017) (in German).
40 Schering Corp. v. Pfizer Inc., 189 F.3d 218, 225 (2d Cir. 1999) (Sotomayor, J.) (first
citing Keith v. Volpe, 858 F.2d 467, 479–81 (9th Cir. 1988); and then citing Debra P. v.
Turlington, 730 F.2d 1405, 1412–14 (11th Cir. 1984)).
41 Courts admit surveys as evidence under the state-of-mind exception to the hearsay
rule, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(3). See Todd Anten, In Defense of Trademark Dilution
Surveys: A Post-Mosley Proposal, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 2 (2005) (“Consumer
surveys have always played prominent roles in trademark disputes, helping judges peek
into the minds of consumers.” (citing Neal Miller, Facts, Expert Facts, and Statistics:
Descriptive and Experimental Research Methods in Litigation, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 101,
137 (1987))); see also Robert C. Bird & Joel H. Steckel, The Role of Consumer Surveys in
Trademark Infringement: Empirical Evidence from the Federal Courts, 14 U. PA. J. BUS. L.
1013, 1025 (2012) (“Courts have called consumer surveys some of the most direct and
persuasive evidence available to establish trademark infringement.” (first citing
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 11 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 11 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 16 18-DEC-17 7:55
1768 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1753
ment or false advertising lawsuit, where the court has to interpret the
meaning of a public communication, the outcome turns on the results
of a survey that asks consumers what the message meant to them.42 In
fact, surveys are such an essential type of evidence that failure to con-
duct them or to demonstrate their favorable findings may be fatal to a
claimant’s case.43 Their use in competitors’ disputes to decipher how
people interpret communications is de facto “black letter law.”44
The gist of the approach presented in this Part is to extend the
existing survey methodology, currently utilized to interpret important
precontractual communications, into the interpretation of contract
language. Contract promises, like marketing communications, are
messages transmitted by one party to another, which create contrac-
tual obligations. When a business drafts a promise (or a disclaimer)
into the standard contract terms, it is communicating with the same
customers to whom advertising and product claims are made. If
surveys are used to interpret what businesses claim, why not also what
they disclaim? More generally, if the survey method is a reliable
method to elicit the impact of the informal marketing-phase messages
on the audience, why isn’t it equally instructive for deciphering the
meaning of drafted contractual terms? We therefore begin in Section
II.A by reviewing the survey method in trademark and unfair compe-
tition law. Section II.B then presents the survey method in contracts
disputes.
Checkpoint Sys., Inc. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270, 283 n.10 (3d Cir.
2001); then citing Vision Sports, Inc. v. Melville Corp., 888 F.2d 609, 615 (9th Cir. 1989);
and then citing McNeil Nutritionals, L.L.C. v. Heartland Sweeteners L.L.C., 566 F. Supp.
2d 378, 392 (E.D. Pa. 2008))).
42 See Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer
Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 134 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating that “a well-designed consumer
survey” asks “‘comprehension’ questions to determine what the viewers thought the
message meant”).
43 See Vision Sports, 888 F.2d at 615 (“An expert survey of purchasers can provide the
most persuasive evidence of secondary meaning.”); 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY
ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:195 (4th ed. 2016) (explaining that
plaintiff’s failure to present a consumer survey creates the perception that it is “less than
deadly serious about [ ] its case”); Joshua M. Dalton & Ilisa Horowitz, Funny When You
Think About It: Double Entendres and Trademark Protectibility, 88 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 649, 652 (2006) (explaining that surveys are “all but indispensable” in
trademark litigation); Sandra Edelman, Failure to Conduct a Survey in Trademark
Infringement Cases: A Critique of the Adverse Inference, 90 TRADEMARK REP. 746, 747
(2000) (explaining that “survey evidence has become de rigueur in trademark infringement
cases” and “many courts will draw an adverse inference against a plaintiff . . . if a survey is
not introduced”).
44 Shari Seidman Diamond & David J. Franklyn, Trademark Surveys: An Undulating
Path, 92 TEX. L. REV. 2029, 2037 (2014).
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A. Trademark and Unfair Competition Surveys
1. The Essential Role of Surveys
A major challenge for a court applying the survey interpretation
method would be to determine the reliability of the survey results and
the legal conclusions to be drawn from them. This is a challenge quite
similar to the one courts have been wrestling with over several
decades of trademark and unfair competition litigation. Thus, there is
no need to reinvent the wheel. Let us examine how courts have
applied and justified the method.
Survey evidence has several key applications in trademark litiga-
tion. One major factor in granting trademark protection is whether a
mark, which consists of descriptive terms, has acquired secondary
meaning.45 And conversely, trademark protection may be lost if a
mark that consists of fanciful terms has become generic.46 Surveys are
also dispositive when a court must decide whether a mark has been
infringed.47 In these inquiries, the question is whether a likelihood of
consumer confusion exists.48 Surveys address this question directly,
asking people to report the inferences they make when seeing the
mark.49
Lawyers showing up in court without consumer survey evidence
to back them may as well show up in a t-shirt and shorts, as “survey
evidence has become de rigueur in trademark infringement cases.”50
Although the Restatement on Unfair Competition counsels against
this inference,51 “many courts will draw an adverse inference against a
plaintiff . . . if a survey is not introduced.”52
Survey evidence is regularly dispositive at the summary judgment
stage.53 Courts often grant summary judgment based on survey evi-
45 MARY LAFRANCE, UNDERSTANDING TRADEMARK LAW 569 (2d ed. 2009).
46 See Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 44, at 2032–40 (providing examples of marks
becoming generic and losing protection).
47 Robert H. Thornburg, Trademark Survey Evidence: Review of Current Trends in the
Ninth Circuit, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 715, 743 (2005) (stating
that “well executed surveys, conducted in multiple locations, to the proper universe of
consumers, is almost dispositive of many of the issues found in trademark disputes”).
48 Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 44, at 2034–35.
49 See Larry C. Jones, Developing and Using Survey Evidence in Trademark Litigation,
19 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 471, 482 (1989) (providing that an acceptable survey once asked, as
a follow-up, “What was there about the sign that made you say that?” (quoting Exxon
Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Hous., Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 1980))).
50 Edelman, supra note 43, at 747.
51 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 23 cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 1995).
52 Edelman, supra note 43, at 747.
53 Thornburg, supra note 47, at 743.
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dence,54 and they deny summary judgment motions when survey evi-
dence shows an issue of material fact.55 Defendants can succeed in
offering exculpatory surveys,56 and parties bearing the burden of
proof can lose at the summary judgment stage if their survey evidence
is flawed, even if the other side does not offer a survey.57
Commentators have documented the central role of survey evi-
dence in trademark litigation using various methodologies, particu-
larly by looking at reported case outcomes.58 But looking only at
published opinions may create a biased impression of the impact of
surveys.59 An especially telling account comes from a study of trade-
mark lawyers, who were asked to evaluate the impact of consumer
surveys on cases that settled before summary judgment or a trial on
the merits. It found “that surveys are used heavily in pretrial assess-
ments and strategic decision making” and play “key roles in claim
evaluation and are understood by attorneys as an influential settle-
ment tool for both sides.”60 Evidence of successful use at trial, there-
fore, “is just the tip of the iceberg” when it comes to the impact of
surveys in shaping trademark outcomes.61
Survey evidence has similar crucial applications in other areas of
unfair competition law, particularly in false advertising claims where
the allegation is that consumers were misled or confused. For
example, an allegation that the defendant’s advertisement implied fal-
sity requires evidence about the mental impressions the ad left on con-
54 See, e.g., Big Island Candies, Inc. v. Cookie Corner, 269 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1250 (D.
Haw. 2003) (acknowledging that judges often expect survey evidence when evaluating
“genericness” issues).
55 See, e.g., Thane Int’l, Inc. v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 305 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002).
56 Fla. Int’l Univ. Bd. of Trs. v. Fla. Nat’l Univ., Inc., 830 F.3d 1242, 1266–67 (11th Cir.
2016) (“The district court reasonably credited FNU’s expert testimony that, while 30% to
50% of survey respondents thought that the State of Florida or some other government
entity operates FNU, less than 1% of survey respondents associated FNU with FIU.”).
57 See, e.g., Spraying Sys. Co. v. Delavan, Inc., 975 F.2d 387, 394 (7th Cir. 1992)
(affirming summary judgment by finding a consumer survey too flawed to create genuine
issue of material fact).
58 See, e.g., Dan Sarel & Howard Marmorstein, The Effect of Consumer Surveys and
Actual Confusion Evidence in Trademark Litigation: An Empirical Assessment, 99
TRADEMARK REP. 1416, 1432 (2009); Itamar Simonson, The Effect of Survey Method on
Likelihood of Confusion Estimates: Conceptual Analysis and Empirical Test, 83
TRADEMARK REP. 364, 366 (1993).
59 Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark
Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1641 (2006) (claiming that the impact of consumer
surveys on litigation outcomes is overrated). For critiques, see, for example, Diamond &
Franklyn, supra note 44, at 2043.
60 Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 44, at 2061.
61 Id. at 2050.
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sumers.62 A leading court established that “the success of a plaintiff’s
implied falsity claim usually turns on the persuasiveness of a consumer
survey.”63
The importance of surveys is likely a product of both the effec-
tiveness of survey evidence in supporting a litigant’s case and the
signal that conducting a survey makes to the other party in demon-
strating seriousness and belief in success.64 This background suggests
that the use of survey evidence is working to inform litigants about the
viability of their cases. Cases settle in the shadow of expected trial
outcomes; in trademark and unfair competition law, they settle in the
shadow of the surveys.
2. The Mechanics of Trademark and False Advertising Surveys
Trademark law has a good deal to say about the evidentiary stan-
dards necessary for survey research to be admissible in court. Obvi-
ously, surveys have to be designed and conducted by experts,
addressed to appropriate respondents, and ask non-leading ques-
tions.65 Judges exclude surveys that fail to satisfy such basic reliability
standards under Federal Rule of Evidence 403.66 Even if admitted, the
weight of survey evidence varies according to, among other factors,
how well the survey captured the relevant “universe” of consumers,67
how representative the sample from that universe was,68 whether a
62 Johnson & Johnson * Merck Consumer Pharm. Co. v. Smithkline Beecham Corp.,
960 F.2d 294, 297 (2d Cir. 1992).
63 Id.; see also Novartis Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer
Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 588 (3d Cir. 2002) (“Novartis should have been required to
prove through a consumer survey that the name and advertising actually misled or had a
tendency to mislead consumers into believing that the product provided nighttime
heartburn relief superior to any other product in the market.”).
64 See Laura A. Heymann, Surveying the Field: The Role of Surveys in Trademark
Litigation, JOTWELL (Feb. 23, 2015), http://ip.jotwell.com/surveying-the-field-the-role-of-
surveys-in-trademark-litigation/ (stating that a party is in a much better position to litigate
or settle a trademark case when investing in consumer surveys).
65 James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 278 (7th Cir. 1976);
Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 387–88 (7th Cir. 1976); Simon
Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1038 (S.D. Ind. 2000).
66 See Robert H. Thornburg, Trademark Surveys: Development of Computer-Based
Methods, 4 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 91, 93 (2004); see also J & J Snack Foods,
Corp. v. Earthgrains Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 358, 370 (D.N.J. 2002) (rejecting a survey because
the attorneys confused descriptive with suggestive marks such that “the survey has no
bearing on the issue it was submitted for”).
67 MCCARTHY, supra note 43, at § 32:159 (“The first step in designing a survey is to
determine the ‘universe’ to be studied . . . [,] [t]he segment of the population whose
perceptions and state of mind are relevant to the issues in the case.”).
68 See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 211 (S.D.N.Y. 1999)
(finding a survey flawed for failure to focus on the relevant “universe”).
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control group was maintained to exclude confounding factors,69 and
whether the results of the survey were verified.70 Courts examine
whether the design, questionnaires, and interviews were unbiased, and
they scrutinize the accuracy of the data analysis and report.71
The incentives to design reliable surveys depend on the reaction
of courts to sloppy ones. Usually, minor errors result in the survey
receiving diminished weight in any subsequent adjudication.72 But
courts take a more aggressive approach towards survey results that
are more prejudicial than probative, excluding such evidence.73 Over
time, courts have been converging on the appropriate trademark
survey methodologies.74 The Federal Judicial Center publishes a refer-
ence guide on survey research that was authored by one of the field’s
69 See, e.g., Masterfoods USA v. Arcor USA, Inc., 230 F. Supp. 2d 302, 305 (W.D.N.Y.
2002) (using multiple controls to eliminate statistical noise).
70 See, e.g., Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, 850 F. Supp. 232, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
(showing the use of verification to cull respondents). For a summary of the Second
Circuit’s requirements for surveys, see Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559
F. Supp. 1189, 1205 (E.D.N.Y. 1983).
71 See J & J Snack Foods, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 369 (summarizing Third Circuit
requirements for survey reliability); Exxon Corp. v. Xoil Energy Res., Inc., 552 F. Supp.
1008, 1022 n.20 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (“The evidentiary value of plaintiff’s survey is lessened
considerably by the absence of practices and procedures . . . useful in assessing the validity
of survey results[,] . . . including: use of only non-leading questions; verification by
reinterviewing a substantial portion of those interviewed; design by qualified experts; and
administration by impartial interviewers.”). See generally MCCARTHY, supra note 43, at
§ 32:171 (providing examples of methodological deficiencies).
72 See MCCARTHY, supra note 43, at § 32:170 (stating that “technical deficiencies can
reduce a survey’s weight”); see also Jellibeans, Inc. v. Skating Clubs of Ga., Inc., 716 F.2d
833, 844 (11th Cir. 1983) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Hous., Inc., 628 F.2d
500, 507 (5th Cir. 1980)) (stating that “alleged technical deficiencies affect the survey’s
weight, however, and not its admissibility”); THOIP v. Walt Disney Co., 690 F. Supp. 2d
218, 219 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (“No survey is perfect and the limits and flaws of a survey
generally go to evidentiary weight . . . .”); MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of
Omaha, Inc., No. 02 Civ. 3691, 2004 WL 326708, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2004) (stating
that errors in the survey methodology go to the weight of the evidence); Thornburg, supra
note 47, at 718 (“The Ninth Circuit’s uniqueness with regard to trademark surveys is based
largely upon its almost ‘carte blanche’ refusal to exclude survey evidence based upon
technical deficiencies.”).
73 See, e.g., GoSmile, Inc. v. Levine, 769 F. Supp. 2d 630, 642–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(questioning the probative value of surveys offered to establish consumer confusion). See
generally Richard J. Leighton, Using Daubert-Kumho Gatekeeping to Admit and Exclude
Surveys in Lanham Act Advertising and Trademark Cases, 92 TRADEMARK REP. 743,
747–53 (2002) (explaining the application of Daubert-Kumho to increasing challenges to
the admission of survey evidence).
74 See Ass Armor, LLC v. Under Armour, Inc., No. 15-cv-20853, 2016 WL, 7156092 at
*2 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2016) (citing the factors advanced by the Judicial Center’s Manual for
Complex Litigation).
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leading academics.75 Likewise, the International Trademark Associa-
tion (whose position should be taken with a grain of salt) concludes
that “it is clear that the approach to the design, execution and presen-
tation of an influential trademark survey is reasonably universal, per-
haps due to its basis upon scientific principles” and that “common law
jurisdictions . . . have substantially greater guidance available [for
courts], reflecting a well-developed practice of using surveys as evi-
dence.”76 Few scholarly commentators doubt the efficacy of survey
evidence per se, with the consensus being that77 “the field of survey
research incorporates all the essential structural techniques of other
scientific expert evidence, including rigorous hypothesis testing,
experimental design, control conditions, and statistical inference.”78
There are occasional skeptical voices, and it might not surprise
anyone that one of them came from Judge Posner, who referred to
statistical surveys as a “black art[ ].”79 Writing in 1994, Judge Posner
questioned whether there was a sound consensus in survey method-
ology, arguing that “[c]onsumer surveys conducted by party-hired
expert witnesses are prone to bias” since “[t]here is such a wide choice
of survey designs, none foolproof.”80 A more polite version of this
concern argues that courts’ treatment of surveys “has been plagued by
inconsistencies and that courts need to more clearly elucidate ex ante
rules” governing proper procedure.81 Some of the inconsistency and
bias may be artifacts of the asymmetry of resources between the
parties.
This is of course a valid concern, but it applies to all aspects and
methods of litigation and does not uniquely or disproportionately con-
75 See Shari Seidman Diamond, Reference Guide on Survey Research, in REFERENCE
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 229 (2d ed. 2000), https://triadcentral.clu-in.org/tech/
documents/Fed_Jud_Center_Paper_on_Scientific_Evidence.pdf.
76 COURTS & TRIBUNALS SUBCOMM., INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, REPORT ON BEST
PRACTICES IN CONDUCTING SURVEYS IN TRADEMARK MATTERS 1 (2013), http://
www.inta.org/PDF%20Library/INTA%20Report%20on%20Best%20Practices%20in%20
Conducting%20Surveys%20in%20Trademark%20Matters.pdf.
77 See Bird & Steckel, supra note 41, at 1026 (“Some commentators have similarly
elevated consumer surveys to high evidentiary importance.”).
78 Ruth M. Corbin & Arthur Renaud, What’s Good for the Goose Is Bad for the
Gander: Why Confusion Surveys for Plaintiff and Defendant Should Be Different, 16
INTELL. PROP. J. 177, 180 (2003).
79 Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d 410, 416
(7th Cir. 1994).
80 Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d
735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013).
81 Irina D. Manta, In Search of Validity: A New Model for the Content and Procedural
Treatment of Trademark Infringement Surveys, 24 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1027, 1032,
1062–66 (2007) (demonstrating some lack of similarity between the survey conditions and
marketplace conditions).
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demn the survey methodology. In light of such concerns, a large back-
ground of law is already in place making survey wording and
technique in trademark disputes reasonably consistent across cases.82
The conclusion is that “[a] substantial amount of case law exists which
provides insight into how to conduct and prepare a trademark survey
that will be admissible in court.”83 Indeed, fifteen years after his
“black art” characterization, Judge Posner had changed his tune,
writing (in a false advertising case) that to determine whether a state-
ment is misleading, “the best evidence is a responsible survey.”84
Trademark surveys are certainly imperfect, but the consensus is
that they are preferable on balance to alternative methods for estab-
lishing the effects of marketing messages and the likelihood of con-
sumer confusion. A quick examination of the case law suggests that
the survey skeptics’ arguments have not carried the day.85 Surveys
that speak to likelihood of confusion use several standardized for-
mats,86 approved by federal appellate courts.87 Similarly, surveys
establishing whether a mark is generic are subject to court-imposed
methodological guidelines.88 Courts are paying attention to the design
of surveys and the suitability of various methodologies, just as they do
with other kinds of expert evidence.
To be sure, slight differences in survey parameters such as ques-
tion wording and sampling can have decisive effects on survey evi-
dence.89 Surveys can be manipulated so as to elicit the desired results;
they also can be resampled or selectively presented.90 Even academic
surveys are prone to this defect, presenting difficulty for the research
82 See Jerre B. Swann, Judge Richard Posner and Consumer Surveys, 104 TRADEMARK
REP. 918, 921 (2014) (providing examples of courts keeping manipulation of consumer
surveys by experts under control).
83 Thornburg, supra note 66, at 91.
84 Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 558 F.3d 623, 628 (7th Cir. 2009).
85 See Simon Prop. Grp. L.P. v. mySimon, Inc., 104 F. Supp. 2d 1033, 1038 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (“Several models for consumer surveys on likelihood of confusion have found
acceptance in the courts.”).
86 See INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, supra note 76, at 13.
87 For a framework set by the Seventh Circuit for the presentation of survey questions,
see Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready, Inc., 531 F.2d 366, 386–87 (7th Cir. 1976). See also
Simon Prop. Grp. L.P., 104 F. Supp. 2d at 1038 (explaining the suitability of the Union
Carbide framework for the question asked and rejecting the survey provided for failing to
answer the question presented as effectively). For a framework set by the Eighth Circuit,
see SquirtCo. v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980).
88 See J & J Snack Foods, Corp. v. Earthgrains Co., 220 F. Supp. 2d 358, 369–72 (D.N.J.
2002) (criticizing the survey in question for confusing the correct definition of law, failing
to correctly identify the relevant universe, and failing to supply sufficient information to
survey takers).
89 See, e.g., Simonson, supra note 58, at 365–66.
90 Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC v. Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc., 735 F.3d
735, 741 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that “[c]onsumer surveys conducted by party-hired expert
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 15 Side A      12/19/2017   13:54:27
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 15 Side A      12/19/2017   13:54:27
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 23 18-DEC-17 7:55
December 2017] INTERPRETING CONTRACTS VIA SURVEYS 1775
community in assessing the data practices underlying surveys’
findings.
This problem is significant, but it is not unique to survey evi-
dence. Much of the evidence presented to courts in adversarial pro-
ceedings by parties interested in affecting the result is cherry-picked.
There is a large literature on these choices, supported by science on
consumer behavior and psychology, to help guide courts and litigants
as to the appropriate approach.91 The solutions typically applied to
such credibility challenges could provide some assurance, and we dis-
cuss them in Section II.B below.
It is telling that the judicial enthusiasm for the survey method in
trademark litigation has not subsided, despite the real challenges. The
inadequacy of alternative tools of interpretation explains the
increasing prevalence of the survey method. Surveys have displaced
evidence that is manifestly worse at evaluating whether consumers
were likely to be confused. Without survey evidence, courts are asked
to either evaluate the testimony of individual members of the public,
who are exceedingly unlikely to show “a fairly representative pic-
ture,”92 or to engage in “an exercise in pure judicial fantasy”93 in spec-
ulating how consumers likely understand the communication. Judges
are asked to evaluate how people with lesser education and legal
experience appreciate marketing messages, and they are sometimes
explicit in conceding that without survey evidence they are unlikely to
reach proper conclusions.94 Trademark and unfair competition law ask
a variety of empirical questions and are increasingly using empirical
tools to answer them.
witnesses are prone to bias” since “[t]here is such a wide choice of survey designs, none
foolproof”).
91 See Swann, supra note 82, at 920–22 (describing examples of cognitive psychology
research that can guide courts in analyzing consumer surveys).
92 Premier-Pabst Corp. v. Elm City Brewing Co., 9 F. Supp. 754, 760 (D. Conn. 1935).
93 Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can. v. Sunlife Juice Ltd. (1988), 65 O.R.2d 496, 500 (Can.
Ont. H. Ct. J.).
94 Judge Weinstein was particularly candid on this issue, stating that:
“[A] federal trial judge, with a background and experience unlike that of most
consumers, is hardly in a position to declare, ‘Because I appreciate that the
television campaign is just expressing a far-fetched opinion and not making a
statement of fact, all viewers must appreciate it as well.’ . . . Arguably, the
communication . . . [may] mean something quite different to the viewer. This
central issue cannot be resolved without surveys, expert testimony, and other
evidence of what is happening in the real world of television watchers.”
Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407 (E.D.N.Y.
2004).
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B. The Survey Method in Contract Interpretation
1. Whom to Survey?
The benchmark case for the application of the survey interpreta-
tion method is a consumer contract. Like advertisements and trade-
marks, the provisions of consumer contracts are directed at
consumers, and in interpreting these provisions courts are trying to
determine how consumers likely understand them. Current interpreta-
tion doctrine asks courts to speculate about the answer to this ques-
tion. The survey interpretation method directs courts to rely instead
on the opinion of large samples of respondents who resemble the con-
tract’s audience.
Interpreting consumer contracts through surveys requires a
sample of like consumers. It is fairly straightforward to identify the
demographics and geographical concentrations of the consumers gov-
erned by the contract and construct a representative sample. Obvi-
ously, respondents need not come solely from consumers who actually
accepted this contract.
The survey interpretation method is potentially well suited to
other contracting environments, like merchant-to-merchant contracts
and negotiated agreements between firms. In these settings, the uni-
verse of potential survey respondents has to be adjusted to include
merchants, lawyers, and other professionals—respondents who have
more insight as to the meaning of the contract. It might be harder to
recruit neutral respondents in some of these contexts because people
familiar with the sector may have a stake in how the interpretive
battle is resolved, which means that the size of the survey would have
to be smaller. Nevertheless, when sector knowledge is necessary, there
is all the more reason to outsource the interpretation to knowledge-
able insiders.95
Consider, for example, the interpretation of sovereign bond con-
tracts. Like consumer contracts, they are all boilerplate. But unlike
consumer contracts, they govern transactions with investors, many of
whom are sophisticated. Their terms are notoriously subject to lengthy
and costly interpretation disputes.96 Could they be interpreted,
instead, by surveys of practitioners? It turns out that the existence of
95 John F. Coyle, The Canons of Construction for Choice-of-Law Clauses, 92 WASH. L.
REV. 631, 682–87 (2017) (showing that in the absence of a systematic survey, judges can
interpret contract language in ways that conflict with the parties’ intentions); see also Solan
et al., supra note 39, at 1292 (reporting on systematic differences in the way that judges and
lay respondents interpreted language in contract disputes).
96 See generally MITU GULATI & ROBERT E. SCOTT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE
TRANSACTION 19–28 (2013); Stephen Choi et al., The Black Hole Problem in Commercial
Boilerplate (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 16–40, 2016).
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interpretation risk has led the Bank of England and top law firms to
form committees in which representative groups of practitioners are
asked to interpret sovereign bond contract language, with an eye to
helping courts reach more objective interpretations.97 While the
reports are far more detailed and technical than the surveys we
imagine (in part because they do not focus on specific disputes), they
nevertheless prove the existence of groups of potential survey respon-
dents with sufficient expertise to whom the interpretation may be out-
sourced. Similarly, in interpreting negotiated contracts, the best group
to sample may be transactional lawyers.98
While consumer contracts provide the most straightforward
application of the survey interpretation method, there are significant
advantages to interpretive consistency across contract types. Using
surveys to interpret all contracts takes some pressure off the determi-
nations that courts otherwise would have to make in boundary cases.
Some discretion would be necessary, at least early on, as to which con-
tracts are most susceptible to survey interpretations, and the uncer-
tainty about how those judgments would be resolved will impose costs
on the parties. The relevant question, of course, is how these costs
compare to those engendered by the substantial uncertainty that pres-
ently exists in contract interpretation.
2. What to Ask?
If the survey produces a winner—an interpretation supported by
a statistically significant and large enough majority—the court would
adopt this as the meaning of the disputed language. If no clear winner
emerges, the court would rule that the disputed term is inherently
ambiguous and the party that bears the burden to prove a specific
meaning of the term loses. Either way, the survey method absolves the
court from the agonizing law/fact dichotomy that besets interpretation
doctrine. Instead of a judge making the pretrial (legal) decision
whether the language has unambiguous meaning (and, if ambiguous, a
trial of fact ensues), the survey resolves both issues of law and fact
conclusively. Survey respondents are both the judge and (a very large)
jury. Indeed, under the survey interpretation method the winner
ought to prevail on a motion for summary judgment.
97 See, e.g., FIN. MKTS. LAW COMM., Pari Passu Clauses: Analysis of the Role, Use and
Meaning of Pari Passu Clauses in Sovereign Debt Obligations as a Matter of English Law
(2015), http://www.fmlc.org/uploads/2/6/5/8/26584807/fmlc_paper_analysing_the_role,_use_
and_meaning_of_pari_passu_clauses_in_sovereign_debt_obligations_as_a_matter_of_
english_law.pdf.
98 We consider some of the details of how that might work infra Section IV.E.
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In theory, survey respondents could be shown any number of
alleged facts that might influence the meaning they assign to the dis-
puted language. The method is thus agnostic with respect to the major
debate within contract interpretation doctrine—the Williston/Corbin
divide on text versus context.99 As contract formalists would like it,
respondents could be shown only the disputed text; or, as the realists
advocate, they could be exposed to additional facts surrounding the
case. Practically, however, the survey method—by typically relying on
respondents with limited attention and sophistication—restricts the
quantum of such background facts. It thus relies on an interpretation
that derives from exposure to, at most, very limited context.
The question of how much information to give the survey respon-
dents is an important methodological challenge in the design of con-
tract interpretation surveys, which goes beyond the issues raised by
trademark surveys. Asking respondents to read the entire contract
will almost never be the right answer because survey respondents
have limited attention spans just like ordinary consumers, and the
more they are asked to read, the less sure we can be that they have
done so diligently. The longer the text shown to respondents, the
more likely it becomes that respondents will answer based on their
normative preferences or provide answers at random.
This is not the only challenge. Another question is whether
respondents should be shown only the plain text and the two proposed
interpretations, or whether they should review the best arguments of
each side in interpreting the language. If they see only the plain text,
how much of it (and of the surrounding clauses that might affect its
intended meaning) should respondents see? A stripped-down survey
more closely resembles how lay readers approach contracts, but the
alternative approach is defensible and likely desirable for some busi-
ness contracts. As in trademark litigation, the method would likely
evolve over time to reflect both methodological rigor and pragmatic
constraints. It is perhaps more important that such design questions be
resolved definitively than correctly.100
99 See, e.g., FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 422 (summarizing the tension between the
four corners test and the concept that all circumstances should be considered when
determining the meaning of a contract); ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF
CONTRACT LAW 232–37 (2004) (explaining the role that the parol evidence rule plays in
contract interpretation).
100 Cf. David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 879–80 (1996) (“[S]ometimes it is more important for a matter to be settled than for it
to be settled right.”).
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3. How to Determine a Winner?
A host of technical questions also arises in implementing survey
techniques. What ratio of prevalence is necessary? For example, does
a 51%–49% margin suffice, assuming the sample size is large enough
to render that result a statistically significant difference from a
50%–50% split? Should courts count differently respondents who say
that the language “definitely” means X versus those who lean in that
direction but say that they are less sure? We think there is a region of
outcomes around 50%–50% that are close enough to a tie that the
meaning of the term ought to be viewed as inherently ambiguous. In
such cases, again, the party that bears the burden to prove a specific
meaning of the term loses. In Part III below, we utilize insights from
the interpretation surveys we conducted to further discuss the proper
majority thresholds.
Further, how should neutral votes count? If a large fraction of the
respondents find the language at issue ambiguous, would it suffice for
an interpretation to receive a majority among the remaining decisive
respondents? In trademark law, some courts apply a “15% rule”—
holding that consumer confusion exists if more than 15% of surveyed
consumers are confused by the mark.101 This is a very low threshold,
suitable perhaps to the protection of a proprietary mark, but not to
the interpretation of contractual language. As we will discuss
below,102 a sizeable minority of even well-compensated survey respon-
dents will answer at random when facing questions with answers they
have not previously considered. Given this propensity, we would be
very reluctant to characterize contractual language as ambiguous just
because 15% or 20% of a representative sample regard it as such.
In ordinary circumstances a claimant would have to demonstrate
some clear majority to prevail. But the survey interpretation method
is well suited to accommodate various strengths of legal presumptions
that would determine the requisite majority. In some contexts, the
majority threshold ought to be shifted against particular parties. For
example, under the doctrine of contra proferentem interpretation
(applicable primarily in insurance contract law), courts are instructed
101 Exxon Corp. v. Tex. Motor Exch. of Hous., Inc., 628 F.2d 500, 507 (5th Cir. 1980)
(noting that 15% of people surveyed confused the mark “Texon” with “Exxon”); Daniel
Gervais & Julie M. Latsko, Who Cares About the 85 Percent? Reconsidering Survey
Evidence of Online Confusion in Trademark Cases, 96 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y
265, 267 (2014). Thresholds on the order of 20% are prevalent in false advertising cases.
See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Ultreo, Inc., 574 F. Supp. 2d 339, 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
102 See infra Section III.B.3.
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to interpret ambiguous terms against the drafter.103 This principle can
be implemented within the survey method by requiring the drafting
party to achieve a “supermajority” of respondents’ support. A 60-40
or 67-33 split, for example, would be adequate for a court to accept
the contract drafters’ preferred interpretation, but a 51-49 split would
not be.104 In general, courts could adjust the majority threshold to
achieve any number of policy goals. If, for example, the law seeks to
promote use of lay or compact language in contracts, a term that fails
these standards could be “sanctioned” by having to achieve a
supermajority.
An implicit question in applying the presumption against the
drafter (or other interpretive presumptions) is how strong the pre-
sumption should be. In the context of the survey method, the question
is what majority support the drafter would be required to show. In
answering this question, the survey method provides an additional
tool currently unavailable. As we show in Part III, the survey method-
ology can identify alternative formulations of language that achieve
the drafter’s intended meaning with less ambiguity. If such formula-
tions were available but not employed, the presumption against the
drafter ought to be strengthened.
4. Reliability of Survey Evidence
An additional methodological challenge for courts would be to
police biases in the execution of the survey experiment that can result
from asymmetric resources of the parties or from manipulations by
experts conducting the surveys. We think that courts can conquer this
challenge. First, courts could rely on each party to scrutinize the
103 See Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 602 (2d Cir. 1947)
(“[C]ontra proferentem is more rigorously applied in insurance than in other contracts, in
recognition of the difference between the parties in their acquaintance with the subject
matter.”); 5 MARGARET N. KNIFFIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: INTERPRETATION OF
CONTRACTS § 24.27 (Joseph M. Perillo ed., rev. ed. 1998) (explaining that contra
proferentem is a “technique” in which courts “adopt the meaning that is less favorable in
its legal effect to the party who chose the words”).
104 Here we part ways with Boardman, supra note 39, at 1111–12, who treats a situation
where 65% of respondents accept one interpretation and 25% accept a different
interpretation as an instance of ambiguity. Boardman’s paper is theoretical—she did not
run experiments like the ones we conducted. Our data suggests that if the threshold for
ambiguity is set as high as she suggests, then nearly every contract will be deemed
ambiguous. Our data shows that survey respondents in general are highly heterogeneous,
and it is difficult to prevent the least conscientious among them from answering more or
less at random or ignoring the text of the contract and interpreting entirely on the basis of
the context and their priors. Those facts do not discredit the methodology; they merely
require careful consideration of the appropriate thresholds. See generally id. at 1116 (“The
consumer-research joke that one can find 10% of people who believe anything is funny
because it’s true.”).
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survey evidence produced by the other side and to highlight any
defects.105 The survey method is readily amenable to experimental
interventions. Subjects can be randomly assigned to different treat-
ments (e.g., prompts, sequences of questions, phraseologies), thereby
enabling survey researchers to isolate the effects of particular survey
design choices on substantive responses. Very few other forms of evi-
dence introduced in litigation have that reassuring attribute.106
Second, courts could threaten to completely disregard surveys
that are tainted in order to induce parties to provide competent
ones.107 Pushing the threat further, courts could deploy a method sim-
ilar to final offer arbitration: In choosing between the two competing
surveys presented by the litigants, courts could rely entirely on the
one that they perceive to have followed more reasonable protocols.
This procedure has well-documented effects of moderating the par-
ties’ self-serving positions.108 The benefit to each party of designing a
biased survey is at least partially offset by the risk of having the survey
“defeated” by the other party’s more reasonable design.109
Third, courts could rely on court-appointed experts to evaluate
the credibility of surveys presented by the parties. Indeed, federal
courts already do precisely that.110 If parties cannot be trusted to elicit
reliable surveys, the method could be restricted to surveys conducted
by neutral experts, initiated and solicited by courts on behalf of both
parties.111 The procedural authority to do so, of course, exists.112 In
105 See Corbin & Renaud, supra note 78, at 178 (explaining the strategies a party can use
to demonstrate weaknesses in the opposing party’s surveys).
106 For a discussion of how this advantage provides insights not otherwise available, see
infra Part III.
107 See, e.g., Malletier v. Dooney & Bourke, Inc., 525 F. Supp. 2d 558, 563 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) (deciding to follow special master academics’ recommendations to exclude several
expert surveys on the basis of methodological flaws).
108 See B. Jay Coleman et al., Convergence or Divergence in Final-Offer Arbitration in
Professional Baseball, 31 INDUS. REL. 238, 244 (1993) (analyzing the effect of final-offer
arbitration on the positions parties present to the tribunal).
109 This type of Final Offer Mechanism can be applied to other problems of contract
interpretation. See Omri Ben-Shahar et al., An Ex-Ante View of the Battle of the Forms:
Inducing Parties to Draft Reasonable Terms, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 350, 353 (2005)
(discussing ways for courts to select the most reasonable standard terms in battle of the
forms litigation, including the final-offer arbitration mechanism).
110 See, e.g., Calvin Klein Cosmetics Corp. v. Parfums de Coeur Ltd., 824 F.2d 665,
670–72 (8th Cir. 1987) (affirming trial court’s appointment of a special master to evaluate
survey and other evidence in a trademark dispute); Malletier, 525 F. Supp. 2d at 563
(following special master academics’ recommendations to exclude several expert surveys
on the basis of methodological flaws); SunAmerica Corp. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Can., 890 F. Supp. 1559, 1570–71 (N.D. Ga. 1994) (involving joint survey conducted by the
litigants at the court’s suggestion), vacated on other grounds, 77 F.3d 1325 (11th Cir. 1996).
111 Phyllis J. Welter, A Call to Improve Trademark Survey Evidence, 85 TRADEMARK
REP. 205, 209 (1995) (calling for the administration of surveys by court-appointed neutral
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anticipation, the parties may agree that the court would select the
survey firm. Or, the parties may contract into an alternative dispute
resolution process that is affiliated with a neutral survey firm. Arbitra-
tors, for example, may offer to the parties a forum that employs,
alongside the legally trained arbitrator, a survey methodologist who
enables the arbitrator to put contested contractual language to the test
of empirical surveys. In this environment, one can imagine the emer-
gence of firms specializing in consumer survey research with a reputa-
tion to protect. We discuss later, in Part V, how survey firms might
branch out and also help parties ascertain the meaning of contracts at
the time of drafting. Such profitable opportunities may bolster, rather
than blur, the incentive of survey professionals to produce reliable
evidence.
III
THE SURVEY INTERPRETATION METHOD IN ACTION
Part I of this Article explained the problem with existing contract
interpretation doctrine. Part II offered to solve the problem by pro-
posing that courts rely on large representative surveys to interpret
contested language in contracts. In the remainder of this Article, we
offer three types of support for the proposed survey interpretation
method. Part III demonstrates the pragmatic argument: Surveys are
practical and inexpensive. Later, Part IV will develop the fuller nor-
mative case, and Part V the doctrinal support, for the survey interpre-
tation method.
To demonstrate the practical value of the survey interpretation
method, we selected several cases in which courts had to interpret dis-
puted language in contracts. We wanted to study how survey respon-
dents interpret these contracts, how they perform vis-a`-vis courts, and
whether we can detect patterns that would give us confidence about
entrusting the interpretive task to such crowds. We presented the
essential facts of the chosen cases to large representative groups of
respondents and asked them to interpret the contractual language. In
this Part, we explain the methodology we used and the results we
obtained. We contrast the results with the outcomes reached by
courts.
experts); see also Indianapolis Colts, Inc. v. Metro. Balt. Football Club Ltd. P’ship, 34 F.3d
410, 415 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the survey method “might be improved by asking each
party’s hired expert to designate a third, a neutral expert who would be appointed by the
court to conduct the necessary studies”).
112 FED. R. EVID. 706 (allowing courts to appoint expert witnesses).
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A. Methodology
In designing the interpretation surveys, we needed to do more
than throw facts of cases in front of respondents and ask them to vote.
This would have proven nothing, since opinion polls can be done for
every conceivable topic. Instead, what we hope to learn is whether the
results of such surveys are consistent with essential patterns of sound
contract interpretation. While our goal was not to develop the best
practices for the design of interpretation surveys, we did hope to
examine at least some baseline strategies for eliciting reliable
responses.
We conducted the surveys in two waves, each containing several
prompts based on the facts of litigated cases. Each prompt described,
in one paragraph, the essence of the contested issue and produced the
text of the disputed term in the contract. The order in which respon-
dents saw these vignettes was randomized. The names of the parties
were changed from those in the real cases. In no instance were the
respondents given any information about how the courts had decided
the disputes in question.
Respondents were asked to select between the interpretation of
the contract offered by a plaintiff and a defendant. Specifically, they
were given five possible answers in each case:113
• Plaintiff’s argument about the contract’s meaning is definitely
right;
• Plaintiff’s argument about the contract’s meaning is probably
right;
• It is completely uncertain whether the plaintiff’s or defendant’s
argument about the contract’s meaning is right;
• Defendant’s argument about the contract’s meaning is probably
right;
• Defendant’s argument about the contract’s meaning is definitely
right.
Wave 1 of the survey presented each respondent with the same
vignettes. Wave 2 of the survey randomly assigned half the respon-
dents to read slightly modified versions of most vignettes. In Wave 2,
we were trying to determine how subjects would react if legally rele-
vant or legally irrelevant changes were made to the vignettes.
Wave 2 asked respondents to answer not only how they inter-
preted the contract at issue, but also how the average person would
interpret it. We did that to see whether respondents as a group were
113 We randomized the order of whether the continuum began with the plaintiff being
definitely right, or with the defendant being definitely right. The randomly assigned order
was held consistent throughout the survey for each respondent.
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good at predicting how the majority of people would respond. If
people can predict accurately how most of their peers would resolve a
case involving contractual ambiguity, it strengthens the case for
making survey evidence of this kind legally dispositive.
The experiment was administered online to a nationally represen-
tative sample recruited by Toluna, a well-regarded survey research
firm.114 One advantage of the Toluna sample is that it is used rela-
tively rarely by academic researchers, rendering the sample less pol-
luted for our purposes.115 Wave 1 of the sample surveyed 1300
respondents, and Wave 2 surveyed 1294 respondents. In each wave, a
few responses were discarded based on respondents completing the
survey unusually quickly, and other attention checks were employed
to make it likely that the respondents in the sample were reading the
questions carefully. Thus, despite some minor differences between the
two samples, both nicely reflected the demographics of the U.S. popu-
lation as a whole, or at least the overwhelming majority of the popula-
tion that uses the Internet.116
B. Results
1. Experiment #1: Ambiguous Homeowner’s Insurance
The first experiment set out to test how respondents react to what
many courts regarded as truly ambiguous language. A necessary con-
dition for the reliability of the survey interpretation method is the
neutrality of the respondents—that is, that ambiguous language pro-
duces a tie.
114 About Us, TOLUNA, http://www.toluna-group.com/about-toluna/about (last visited
Apr. 21, 2017).
115 In Wave 1, the mean age of the 1300 respondents was 45.7 with a range of 18 to 90
years old and a standard deviation of 16.1. Females comprised 51.0% of the sample. In this
sample, 81.5% of respondents self-identified as White, 10.5% as Black, and 3.5% as South
or East Asian. On a separate question, 15.5% of the sample reported that they are Latino
or Hispanic. About 11.4% of the sample had not finished high school, 30.4% had high
school diplomas, 29.1% had some college experience, 19% had college degrees, and 10.2%
had some kind of graduate degree.
Wave 2 of the sample was demographically similar. Among the 1294 respondents who
satisfied our attention checks, the mean age was 46.8, with a range of 18 to 87 years old and
a standard deviation of 16.94. Females comprised 52.6% of the sample. In this sample,
79.2% of respondents self-identified as White, 11.8% as Black, and 2.9% as South or East
Asian. On a separate question, 17.2% of the sample reported that they are Latino or
Hispanic. About 11.0% of the sample had not finished high school, 32.6% had high school
diplomas, 29.1% had some college experience, 18.1% had college degrees, and 9.2% had
some kind of graduate degree.
116 For a discussion of the demographics of internet and non-internet users in the United
States, see Andrew Perrin & Maeve Duggan, Americans’ Internet Access: 2000–2015, PEW
RESEARCH CENTER (June 26, 2015), http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/06/26/americans-
internet-access-2000-2015/.
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We chose a term in insurance contracts that has long split courts,
and which has often been characterized by courts as ambiguous.117
The courts that view the term as unambiguous are almost evenly split
as to its meaning.118 The term deals, not surprisingly, with insurance
coverage exclusions (often phrased as double- or triple-negative). Spe-
cifically, standard homeowners insurance policies contain coverage
against tort liability arising from injuries to house visitors.119 These
policies explicitly exclude injuries arising from commercial or business
pursuits (coverage for these is sold separately, for higher premiums).
Under the business-pursuits exclusion, for example, a doctor who runs
his clinic from home is not covered by his homeowners insurance for
malpractice liability.
But what about a babysitter? This question came up, for example,
in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Moore,120 in which the home-
owner, Rebecca Moore, was watching her own child and was paid by
her neighbors to also care for their son. The neighbor’s son was
injured when boiling water from the kitchen stove accidentally spilled
on him. The neighbors sued, and Moore asked State Farm to defend
her under the homeowners policy. State Farm refused, based on the
policy’s business-pursuits exclusion, which says: “This policy does not
apply . . . to bodily injury or property damage arising out of business
pursuits of any insured except activities therein which are ordinarily
incident to nonbusiness pursuits.”121
The trial court in Illinois granted summary judgment in State
Farm’s favor, interpreting the language to unambiguously exclude the
injuries.122 The appellate court reversed. Focusing on the phrase
“except activities . . . ordinarily incident to nonbusiness pursuits,” two
judges held that this exception to the exclusion applied unambigu-
ously because boiling a pot of water was something Moore would have
done for nonbusiness reasons.123  They also cited the many prior cases
that interpreted this exact phrase and found that courts reached con-
flicting holdings.124 This suggested to the majority judges that, at the
117 See Stanley v. Am. Fire & Cas. Co., 361 So. 2d 1030, 1032 (Ala. 1978); Crane v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d 1129, 1131 (Cal. 1971); Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v.
Collins, 222 S.E.2d 828, 830–31 (Ga. Ct. App. 1975).
118 See Robinson v. Utica Mut. Ins. Co., 585 S.W.2d 593, 595–98 (Tenn. 1979) (citing
numerous cases that construe the same policy language, with some finding it ambiguous
and others not).
119 See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 832 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 2016).
120 430 N.E.2d 641 (Ill. App. 1981).
121 Id. at 643.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 643, 646–47.
124 Id. at 646–47.
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very least, the language was ambiguous in its application to situations
like Moore’s.125 And when insurance contract language is ambiguous,
courts interpret it against the insurer.126 The dissenting judge sided
with the trial court, thinking that the exclusion applied
unambiguously.127
When we presented the respondents with the facts of Moore in
Wave 1 of our study, we received the following results:128
TABLE 1A. HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE
Answers Frequency Percent
Injury DEFINITELY covered 159 15.9
Injury PROBABLY covered 201 20.1
Coverage is COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN 182 18.2
Injury PROBABLY NOT covered 269 26.9
Injury DEFINITELY NOT covered 189 18.9
Total 1000 100.0
Respondents preferred the insurance company’s interpretation,
although not the overwhelming majority. 36% of the respondents said
that the policy either definitely or probably covered the injuries,
whereas almost 46% said that the policy definitely or probably did not
cover the injuries. We confirmed that this pro-insurer interpretation is
statistically significant.129 Notice that in either the “covered” or the
“uncovered” group a similar fraction of respondents was in the “defi-
nitely” category. Thus, in this particular case our results would not
change if we weight more heavily the “definitely” responses.
While the insurer’s interpretation prevailed, the margin was slim:
Only 56% of those choosing one of the two sides favored the insurer.
There was also a sizeable group of “uncertain,” such that 54% of the
respondents did not affirmatively choose the insurer’s position. This
125 Id. at 647 (“Under the terms of the clause, the particular facts of this case could
reasonably be interpreted to be covered or excluded. Because of this ambiguity, doubt is
resolved in favor of coverage for the Moores.”).
126 RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE § 4 (Proposed Final Draft
2017).
127 430 N.E.2d at 648 (Reinhard, J., dissenting).
128 We removed from the results “implausible” answers—those who spent less than five
minutes answering the questions.
129 We confirmed this conclusion with the following statistical approach. Looking only at
respondents who did not choose “uncertain,” 44% of the remaining chose “covered” and
56% chose “not covered.” Given that the data we observed is a random draw out of the
population, how certainly can we accept the hypothesis that, in the actual population, less
than 50% would respond “covered” (i.e., the insurance company prevails)? The likelihood
that a majority of the population would favor “not covered” is, according to the test we
ran, 99.97%—well above the conventional 95% acceptable confidence rate.
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slim victory can be regarded as a weak confirmation for the results
courts reach. We noted that courts are split on the question whether a
babysitter is covered under the policy, either concluding that the
policy is ambiguous or splitting fairly evenly as to its unambiguous
meaning. Our respondents were similarly split: We cannot say that the
insurer won a resounding survey victory. With such small margin,
courts’ instinct to interpret against the drafter could make good sense.
Given this less than ringing victory for the insurer’s interpreta-
tion, we now wanted to test another important property: How do
survey respondents change their interpretation when the ambiguity is
reduced? For the method to be reliable, respondents must show a pro-
pensity to shift towards the position that the new language favors. To
that end, we split the Wave 2 respondents into two groups. Half of
them (the control group) were asked exactly the same question as the
Wave 1 respondents. The other half (the treatment group) were shown
shorter, seemingly less ambiguous and more pro-insurer, contractual
language:
“This policy does not apply to bodily injury arising out of business
pursuits of the homeowner.”
We expected this language to have two effects: First, without the
complex and confusing exception to the exclusion about “activities
ordinarily incident to nonbusiness pursuits,” fewer respondents would
choose “uncertain.” Second, without the exception to the exclusion,
the exclusion could only be broadened, and therefore more respon-
dents would side with the insurance company. We received the fol-
lowing results:
TABLE 1B. REDUCED AMBIGUITY HOMEOWNERS INSURANCE
Original Exclusion Shortened Exclusion
Answers
(Control Group) (Treatment Group)
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Injury DEFINITELY covered 98 15.2 82 12.6
Injury PROBABLY covered 121 18.8 98 15.1
UNCERTAIN 122 18.9 96 14.8
Injury PROBABLY NOT covered 153 23.8 187 28.8
Injury DEFINITELY NOT covered 150 23.3 186 28.7
Total 644 100.0 649 100.0
Sure enough, respondents in the treatment group who were
shown the new relatively unambiguous version of the policy over-
whelmingly sided with the insurer’s interpretation of no-coverage:
58% of the sample sided with the insurer (compared to 47% in the
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control group), and only 28% sided with the policyholder (compared
to 34% in the control group).130 The percentage of the sample saying
the policy’s meaning was uncertain also declined (from 18% to 15%).
This tells us that respondents as a whole reliably pick up on improve-
ments in clarity. It also tells us that if the survey interpretation method
were employed, it would have been possible for an insurance company
like State Farm to draft its policy in a way that would cause a
supermajority of respondents (more than 2-to-1) to embrace the com-
pany’s preferred interpretation.
In sum, Experiment #1 provided some baseline assurance that
ambiguous terms are viewed as such by survey respondents, and that
improvements in the clarity of the terms correctly shift the results of
the survey.
2. Experiment #2: Ambiguous Bonus Agreement
Experiment #1 dealt with a classic case of ambiguous language. In
Experiment #2, we wanted to see how respondents decide a case that
judges viewed as unambiguous, but where different judges assigned
different (unambiguous) meanings to the contract language. We
hoped that this exercise would begin to give us some clue as to how
judges and respondents differ in their interpretation instincts.
Some of the classic cases about contractual ambiguity arise in
employment bonus agreements.131 Such was the issue in an Illinois
Supreme Court case, Storybook Homes, Inc. v. Carlson,132 in which
the employer and its two employees agreed on a profit sharing bonus
that stated:
[T]he bonus shall be computed in the following manner
0 to $10,000 Net Profit No Bonus
$10,000 to $20,000 a maximum bonus of 5% Shall be paid to both
[employees]
$20,000 and over a Maximum bonus of 22% shall be paid to each.133
130 The results are highly statistically significant. It is also assuring that the control
group’s behavior mimicked that of the Wave 1 respondents: Almost the same ratio of
respondents sided with the insurer (47% to 46%).
131 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Miranda, 507 S.E.2d 789 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (determining
whether a terminated employee was entitled to a prorated share of the yearly bonus set
forth in his employment contract); Varney v. Ditmars, 111 N.E. 822 (N.Y. 1916) (involving
a contract term in which the employee was promised a “fair share” of the profits);
Salvaggio v. New Breed Transfer Corp., 564 S.E.2d 641, 643 (N.C. Ct. App. 2002)
(determining whether voluntary termination by an employee precludes collecting a bonus
for the time they worked).
132 312 N.E.2d 27 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
133 Id. at 28.
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Subsequently, the firm earned profits exceeding $20,000. The
question came up: Is the employee entitled to 22% of all profits
(employee’s position) or only 22% of those profits above $20,000, and
a smaller percentage (0% and 5%) of the rest (employer’s position)?
The question was submitted to the jury, which sided with the
employee.  The trial judge then entered judgment N.O.V. in favor of
the employer.  The judge found that the bonus term was unambiguous
because only the employer’s interpretation of the language made busi-
ness sense.  The judge also invoked a somewhat obscure canon of
interpretation—the last antecedent clause canon, which applies the
22% provision only to the last clause in the excerpt—to support his
conclusion.134 The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the trial court’s
judgment unanimously on both grounds, saying that the language at
issue “so overwhelmingly” favored employer’s interpretation that “no
contrary verdict . . . could ever stand.”135
We puzzled over this case, because in our view the express term is
easily susceptible to both interpretations—a fact that doctrinally
ought to have left the resolution in the hands of the jury. We
presented the survey respondents with a simplified version of the
bonus clause, which evoked the same interpretation challenge:
The employee will receive an annual bonus in the following manner:
• $1 to $20,000 store profits – 5% Bonus;
• $20,000 store profits and over – 20% Bonus.
Respondents were told that the firm earned a profit of $25,000
and were asked to pick between the employee’s claim of a $5000
bonus (20% of the entire profit) and the employer’s interpretation of
a $2000 bonus (5% of the first $20,000 profit plus 20% of the profit
above the $20,000 threshold). We explained to the respondents how
each of the contending bonus figures was computed. The distribution
of results from the question “How much does the employer owe the
employee?” was:
134 Id. The trial judge held that under the employee’s interpretation a few dollars
difference could have major economic consequences. Id. at 30. It was also unlikely that the
firm intended to award each employee (even two important employees) 22% of total
profits. See id. at 30 (noting the “exceedingly large percentage of profit consumed by such
an interpretation”).
135 Id. at 29–30 (quoting Pedrick v. Peoria & E. R.R. Co., 229 N.E.2d 504, 511 (Ill.
1967)).
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 22 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 22 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 38 18-DEC-17 7:55
1790 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1753
TABLE 2A. BONUS AGREEMENT
Answers Frequency Percent
DEFINITELY $5000 264 26.4
PROBABLY $5000 207 20.7
It is COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN whether it is
appropriate to pay the employee $5000 or $2000 248 24.8
PROBABLY $2000 166 16.6
DEFINITELY $2000 115 11.5
Total 1000 100.0
Interestingly, the respondents had a reaction similar to the jury’s
reaction—the employee’s (more remunerative) interpretation of the
contract language was the more reasonable interpretation. About
47% of respondents in Wave 1 thought the employee’s interpretation
was definitely or probably correct, versus 28% who thought the
employer’s interpretation was definitely or probably correct. Among
those who took a position, almost two-thirds (63%) sided with the
employee’s interpretation.136 Many respondents answered that the
language was completely ambiguous, perhaps because the question
required arithmetic computation exceeding their level of numeracy.137
What was going on? Possibly, the term is equally susceptible to
two legitimate interpretations, yet we obtained one-sided results
because respondents favor the “little guy.” This could be thought of as
a bias, which would be problematic (even though it might afflict juries
as well). Or, it could be thought of as an intuitive manifestation of the
contra proferentem logic—a bias against the drafting party whose
carelessness created the ambiguity.138 To arbitrate between the two
conjectures, we reran the survey in Wave 2. This time, we showed half
of the respondents the same language as in Wave 1 (the control
group), and the other half a clearer text:
136 This ratio—only 34% of those who did not choose “uncertain” favored the
employee’s interpretation—was exactly replicated in Wave 2. A statistical test confirmed
that this ratio is highly statistically significant as a measure of the actual ratio in the
population.
137 See MARK KUTNER ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
EDUC., LITERACY IN EVERYDAY LIFE: RESULTS FROM THE 2003 NATIONAL ASSESSMENT
OF ADULT LITERACY 4, 13 (2007) (reporting that 22% of the adult population is at “below
basic” level of numeracy—able to only locate numbers and perform simple operations
(primarily addition) with very concrete and familiar information).
138 Sturm v. United States, 421 F.2d 723, 727 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (stating that the rule “puts
the risk of ambiguity, lack of clarity, and absence of proper warning on the drafting party
which could have forestalled the controversy; it pushes the drafters toward improving
contractual forms; and it saves contractors from hidden traps not of their own making”).
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The employee will receive an annual bonus of 5% on any store
profits earned between $1 and $20,000. If the store earns profits
above $20,000, the employee will receive a 20% bonus only on those
amounts above $20,000.
This new language very clearly favors the employer’s position.
Indeed, it would be challenging to draft a clearer but still succinct
clause. The results were the following:
TABLE 2B. REDUCED AMBIGUITY BONUS AGREEMENT
Clearer (Pro-Employer)
Original Bonus Agreement Bonus Agreement
Answers
(Control Group) (Treatment Group)
Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
DEFINITELY $5000 181 28.5 101 15.4
PROBABLY $5000 139 21.9 109 16.6
It is COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN
whether it is appropriate to pay 134 21.1 116 17.7
the employee $5000 or $2000
PROBABLY $2000 107 16.9 103 15.7
DEFINITELY $2000 74 11.7 227 34.6
Total 635 100.0 656 100.0
The control group, which saw the same language as in Wave 1,
behaved exactly as the Wave 1 respondents, with a ratio of 50% to
29% favoring the employee, and 21% saying the contract’s meaning
was completely uncertain. But the treatment group, which saw the
revised language that clearly favors the employer, flipped, with a ratio
of 50% to 32% now favoring the employer.139 The percentage of
respondents saying the employer’s position was definitely correct
tripled. It is admittedly disquieting that even such clear language did
not elicit a more one sided distribution of results, suggesting the exist-
ence of some pro-little guy sentiment, or perhaps some numeracy defi-
ciencies on the part of respondents. But the strong, statistically
significant majority should suffice to point the courts toward the pro-
employer interpretation.140
139 The results are statistically significant, at the 99% level.
140 An alternative approach in a case like Storybook would be to use the survey
evidence to calculate a weighted average, moving the law away from a binary choice. When
64% of (non-“uncertain”) respondents favor the employer and 36% favor the employee,
the bonus would amount to $3080 (calculated as the weighted average 0.64 × $2000 + 0.36 ×
$5000). The weighted average approach would also permit researchers to utilize some of
the granularity that arises from a five-point scale rather than a two-point or three-point
scale, by giving greater weight to “definitely” responses.
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In sum, Experiment #2 provides ample reason to critique what
the judges did in Storybook. The state supreme court’s determination
that the bonus provision “overwhelmingly favored” Storybook’s inter-
pretation was probably not an accurate reflection of how the
employees understood the contractual language. Only 28% of our
sample agreed with the court’s characterization. The jury was on to
something important that the judges completely missed. Moreover, as
our Wave 2 data shows, the employer-drafter could have made small
tweaks to its employment agreement that would have caused the
bonus term to clearly convey the drafter’s intent.
3. Experiment #3: Interpretation Against the Drafter
What majority should suffice for a court to hold that a particular
interpretation prevails? How should the court account for the fre-
quency of the “uncertain” response? And do these heuristics depend
on who among the parties drafted the contract? To gain some insight
on these issues, we turned again to insurance contracts.
Experiment #3 was based in part on the facts of Vargas v. Insur-
ance Co. of North America, a Second Circuit opinion interpreting the
language of an aviation insurance policy.141 The policy in question
applied “only to occurrences, accidents or losses which happen . . .
within the United States of America, its territories or possessions,
Canada or Mexico.”142 The crash of a small airplane occurred as the
plane was flying from New York to Puerto Rico, in international
waters twenty-five miles west of Puerto Rico. The pilot policyholder’s
estate argued that a trip from New York to the U.S. territory of
Puerto Rico meant that the crash was covered. The insurer argued
that because the fatal crash occurred outside of Puerto Rico’s territo-
rial waters, the policy did not apply.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the insurer, but the
Second Circuit reversed, finding the language to be ambiguous and
invoking the rule that ambiguous language (which could have been
made clearer by better drafting) should be interpreted against the
drafter.143 We showed respondents in Wave 1 a vignette based on
Vargas, and obtained these results:
141 651 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1981).
142 Id. at 839.
143 Id. at 838, 840–42 (“The policy in this case is . . . ambiguous . . . and the insurer bears
the responsibility for not adopting a clear exclusion.”).
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TABLE 3A. PUERTO RICO AIRPLANE CRASH INSURANCE
Answers Frequency Percent
Crash DEFINITELY covered 125 12.5
Crash PROBABLY covered 134 13.4
It is COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN whether the crash
is covered 226 22.6
Crash PROBABLY NOT covered 308 30.8
Crash DEFINITELY NOT covered 207 20.7
Total 1000 100.0
A strong majority favored the insurer’s interpretation over the
insured’s (51% to 26%), consistent with the trial court’s position. The
result is statistically significant, which means that we can be confident
that more than 50% of the population would favor the insurer’s inter-
pretation. This is a strong margin of prevalence, where two-thirds of
respondents who chose one of the two positions sided with the
insurer. We think that such a margin should suffice to defeat the
contra proferentem presumption.
This is not to say that the insurer drafted the clearest of all lan-
guages. The insurer could have removed some of the ambiguity with
better drafting, and we now show that if parties draft more carefully,
they can win interpretation battles with more convincing majorities. In
Wave 2, we chose a contested aviation insurance term from a different
case, Security Insurance Co. of Hartford v. Andersen.144 In that case,
the policy contained a condition for coverage requiring that the pilot
hold a valid and current medical certificate attesting fitness to fly.145
More precisely, it read, “this Policy shall apply only while the aircraft
is operated in flight by the pilot(s) designated below and then only if
the said pilot . . . holds a valid and current medical certificate of the
appropriate class[.]”146
At the time of the crash, the pilot did not have such a certificate,
because it had expired a few months before his fatal accident. The
policyholder’s estate argued that since there was no causal connection
between the failure to obtain the medical certification and the crash,
the policy should cover the crash. The intermediate appellate court
accepted this argument, as some other jurisdictions had done, and
determined that the crash would be covered in the absence of a causal
link.147 The Supreme Court of Arizona unanimously disagreed,
144 763 P.2d 246 (Ariz. 1988).
145 Id. at 247–48.
146 Id. at 248 (emphasis omitted).
147 Id. at 249.
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 24 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 24 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 42 18-DEC-17 7:55
1794 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1753
finding that the insurance policy language at issue was “completely
unambiguous.”148 Under the language of the agreement, there was no
need for the insurance company to show any causal connection
between the absence of a medical certification and the cause of the
crash.149
We showed respondents a vignette based on Andersen in Wave 2
of the survey. This time, respondents overwhelmingly agreed with the
insurer’s interpretation (65%, versus 22% favoring the policyholder,
and only a relatively low 13% of the sample choosing “completely
uncertain”).150 Now, 75% of those siding with one of the two interpre-
tations sided with the insurer. This 65-22 margin of prevalence is sta-
tistically significantly greater than the margin of prevalence (51-26)
that we saw in the Vargas vignette. This level of consensus in
Andersen would surely be adequate to overcome contra proferentem,
resulting in a win for the insurer.
TABLE 3B. ARIZONA AIRPLANE CRASH INSURANCE
Answers Frequency Percent
Crash DEFINITELY covered 146 11.3
Crash PROBABLY covered 137 10.6
It is COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN whether the crash is covered 168 13.0
Crash PROBABLY NOT covered 353 27.3
Crash DEFINITELY NOT covered 489 37.8
Total 1293 100.0
Under any workable legal regime, the answer provided by the
Arizona Supreme Court in Andersen has to be the correct one, given
the clarity of the contractual provision. At the same time, even when
confronted with language that the Arizona Supreme Court held to be
“completely unambiguous,” 22% of the sample reached the opposite
interpretation. We therefore think that the Andersen case can help
“normalize” the results of interpretation surveys by establishing
benchmarks for preponderance. The standard for ambiguity when
148 Id.
149 Id. at 250–51.
150 Wave 2 respondents were randomly assigned to two different conditions reflecting
legally irrelevant alterations to the vignette. The control group was told (correctly) that the
policy required both a valid medical certificate and an FAA certification to fly. The
treatment group saw that the policy required only a valid medical certificate. The
respondents were given no information to suggest that the presence of an FAA
certification was contested by the insurance company, so the experimental manipulation
merely lengthened the vignette and added superfluous complexity. The change made no
difference, as there were no significant differences across conditions.
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using the consumer survey method cannot be whether 15% or 20% of
a sampled population embraces the minority view. Nor should the fact
that 15% of a sample says language is completely ambiguous cause a
court to agree with them. Some respondents may be answering at
random, misunderstanding the language and survey questions, or
focusing entirely on the equities of the vignettes, suggesting that even
in clear-cut cases a sizeable minority of respondents will go the other
way.
While further work is needed to generate effective thresholds, we
think it can be done. If surveys of clear and unambiguous language
generate, for example, an average “uncertain” response rate of 20%,
this should be the new “zero” and only rates exceeding this baseline
should count as true votes for ambiguity. Likewise, if a clear term gar-
ners only an average support of 75% of those siding with one of the
two interpretations, this should be the new “100%” and majority rates
should be normalized in relation to it.151 Perhaps there should also be
a sliding scale: the larger the “uncertain” block, the greater the
majority required among the rest.
4. Experiment #4: A “Little Guy” Effect?
As we hinted in our discussion of Experiments 2 and 3, some
respondents to surveys more often share the experiences and perspec-
tives of the “little guy.” As a result, aggregate responses might be
biased against corporations and other large entities. While the two
previous experiments gave us confidence that most respondents can
be trusted to side even with employers or the insurance industry when
the language is clear, we nevertheless wanted to see whether there is a
“little guy” effect in a context in which it is most likely to arise. The
context we chose is a covenant not to compete in an employment con-
tract. Such covenants restrict the ability of workers to switch jobs and
are regarded by many as unfair. They are illegal or borderline illegal
in some jurisdictions, and we think there is a widespread sentiment to
limit their application, especially when the employee is fired.152
151 For example, under these assumptions, survey results of an unambiguous pro-X term
would be, on average, 60% to 20% in favor of X among those voting for one of the two
interpretations, with 20% choosing “uncertain.” The case for X should not be weakened by
its failure to exceed the 60% threshold or by the presence of 40% who did not favor it.
152 Courts generally only enforce these covenants if their time and geographic
restrictions are reasonable. See, e.g., Meyer v. Wineburgh, 110 F. Supp. 957, 959 (D.D.C.
1953) (holding that a restrictive covenant is valid if it is “reasonably limited as to time and
territory” and does not  “work an unfair hardship upon the restricted party”); see also In re
UFG Int’l, Inc., 225 B.R. 51, 56 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (“The cases which hold that a covenant
not to compete is unenforceable against an employee who is terminated without cause are
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In Cambridge Engineering v. Mercury Partners, an employee of
company A who worked as a sales representative signed a covenant
not to compete.153 After he was fired, he took a job with company B, a
competitor of company A. The non-compete agreement at issue estab-
lished in relevant parts that: “Employee shall not, for a period of 24
months following the termination of his/her employment, . . . engage
in any activity for or on behalf of Employer’s competitors, or engage
in any business that competes with Employer, anywhere in the United
States or Canada.”154
Does this language preclude an employee of company A from
working for company B? The first possible interpretation is broad:
Any job with company B is prohibited, even if it does not directly
compete with company A, because company B is a competitor. Under
this interpretation, it would be prohibited for the employee to take a
job even as a janitor for company B. The second possible interpreta-
tion is narrow: The prohibition applies only to jobs with company B
that directly compete with company A.155 The court chose the broad
interpretation, relying on an interpretive canon—the so-called rule
against “surplusage.”156
Survey respondents were presented with a vignette modeled on
the Cambridge case. They were told that the employee worked as a
salesperson for company A and agreed to a non-compete clause that
said:
Employee may not engage in any activity for competitors of [com-
pany A], or engage in any business that competes with [company
A].
Respondents were told that the employee took a job as a human
resources officer with company B, thus not directly competing with
company A’s sales staff. They were asked whether the employee was
prohibited by the non-compete clause from taking this job with com-
premised on the unfairness of permitting an employer who has destroyed the mutuality of
obligation on which the covenant rests to benefit from the covenant.”).
153 879 N.E.2d 512 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007).
154 Id. at 517.
155 Ironically, in Cambridge it was the employee who argued for the broad
interpretation. Id. at 524–25. Under Illinois law, a non-compete that is overbroad in
scope—that forbids the employee from taking new positions that do not directly compete
with the original employer—is against public policy and entirely unenforceable. See id. at
523 (explaining that in order for the covenant to be enforceable, its territorial scope must
be reasonable and coextensive with the area in which the employer does business).
Conversely, it was the company that advocated for the narrow interpretation, hoping that
it would survive the enforceability test. Id. at 524–25.
156 Id. at 525. The court emphasized that under the narrow interpretation, the language
“for or on behalf of Employer’s competitors” would be rendered superfluous. Id.
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pany B. Identical language was tested in both waves of the survey.
Here are the results:
TABLE 4. BONUS AGREEMENT
Wave 1 Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 2
Answers Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
DEFINITELY prohibited 307 30.7 501 38.7
PROBABLY prohibited 301 30.1 295 22.8
COMPLETELY UNCERTAIN 239 23.9 241 18.6
PROBABLY NOT prohibited 97 9.7 144 11.1
DEFINITELY NOT prohibited 57 5.7 111 8.6
Total 1001 100.0 1292 100.0
Wave 1 respondents agreed lopsidedly (and in a statistically sig-
nificant manner) with the broad interpretation—that the non-compete
agreement prohibited the employee from taking any position with
company A’s competitor (61% versus 15%). These results were repli-
cated in Wave 2 of the survey. The supermajoritarian interpretation in
both waves is opposed to the superficially apparent interests of the
“little guy.”157 It is encouraging that the results did not vary materially
over time, suggesting that a firm could safely field test contract terms
at early phases and accurately anticipate their subsequent legal
exposure.
5. Experiment #5: Interpretation of Consumer Standard Form
Contract
Our final illustration concerns the interpretation of a term in
Gmail’s privacy policy.158 We included it here, even though these find-
ings have been reported elsewhere, because it illustrates additional
promise for the survey interpretation method. The case itself is still
pending, but it has dragged on for years and proved costly to resolve.
157 An alternative possibility is that some respondents harbored antipathy towards an
employee seen as disloyal, rather than having pro-little guy sentiment. These varied moral
frames would counteract one another in our data. It is also possible that some tiny share of
the well-informed respondents who understood the counterintuitive effect—that a broad
interpretation would actually benefit the employee because it renders the entire non-
compete covenant void—voted for the broad interpretation strategically. If such an effect
existed, it would be small, and it would bias results against the result reached by the court,
which was that the covenant as written precluded work of any type for a competitor.
158 This illustration comes from a separate experimental survey, conducted prior to the
other surveys reported above and published separately. See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz &
Matthew B. Kugler, Is Privacy Policy Language Irrelevant to Consumers?, 45 J. LEGAL
STUD. S69, S77–80 (2016) (describing the results of the Gmail experiment).
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The case displays some of the problems with the existing court-based
interpretation. Could the survey method do better?
In the Gmail litigation, Google was sued for scanning users’ email
messages, a practice that—unless agreed upon by users—would be
regarded as a violation of federal wiretap laws and subject to enor-
mous damages.159 In its defense, Google invoked a term in its privacy
policy, by which users allegedly grant consent to scan their email
messages. The parties contested the meaning of the term and whether
it indeed granted Google explicit consent from users. The early-stage
litigation turned on the interpretation of one paragraph.160 In denying
Google’s motion to dismiss, the federal district court held that the
term in the privacy policy was ambiguous.161 It was therefore a triable
issue whether the term was effective to secure users’ consent to the
company’s practice.
As it happens, Yahoo was also sued for having engaged in email
scanning conduct very similar to Google’s conduct, and the case was
assigned to the same federal judge.162  Here, the judge found that
Yahoo’s privacy policy was unambiguous and provided Yahoo users
with notice adequate to secure their consent.163 In short, the court
interpreted the two contracts differently: Only Yahoo users, but not
Gmail users, received unambiguous notice and consented to the con-
tent analysis.
When randomly assigned respondents read either the legally
unambiguous Yahoo policy or the legally ambiguous Gmail policy,
there was no statistically significant difference in the percentage of
readers who regarded the policies as sufficiently informative to obtain
their consent to the practices at issue. Asked if the contract term
allowed Gmail to scan their emails, a surprisingly strong majority of
respondents said that it was in fact unambiguous in informing con-
sumers about the scanning of their emails.164 This was the case even
though respondents regarded the email provider’s conduct at issue
(automated content analysis of user emails for the purposes of
showing user personalized ads) as quite intrusive.
159 In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430, 2013 WL 5423918, at *1 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 26, 2013).
160 In reality, there were three separate versions of this term, as Google has changed the
text over the years. Id. at *13–14.
161 Id. at *14.
162 In re Yahoo Mail Litig., 7 F. Supp. 3d 1016 (N.D. Cal. 2014).
163 Id. at 1029.
164 Strahilevitz & Kugler, supra note 158, at S77–78. The experiment differed from the
experiments for this article in one aspect: Respondents did not have a choice of
“completely ambiguous.” Id. at S78.
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 27 Side A      12/19/2017   13:54:27
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 27 Side A      12/19/2017   13:54:27
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 47 18-DEC-17 7:55
December 2017] INTERPRETING CONTRACTS VIA SURVEYS 1799
TABLE 5. GMAIL/YAHOO PRIVACY AGREEMENT
Answers Percent
DEFINITELY ALLOWED 26.6
PROBABLY ALLOWED 38.5
PROBABLY NOT ALLOWED 13.4
DEFINITELY NOT ALLOWED 21.3
Total 99.8
This is disconcerting. Changes in the language that a court
deemed legally decisive were regarded as irrelevant by participants in
a randomized experiment.165 The Google and Yahoo cases therefore
represent further instances in which courts, adjudicating lengthy and
costly interpretation battles, are characterizing the common under-
standing of contractual language in ways that are at odds with the
actual reactions of a representative sample of lay Americans.
C. Summary
The results of experiments one through four can be collected in
the following figure:
165 Strahilevitz and Kugler obtained similar results in a separate study of Facebook users
that presented them with precise and vague policies describing Facebook’s use of facial
recognition software to facilitate photo tagging. See id. at S80–83 (showing no significant
difference in respondents’ interpretation despite changes in the wording of the policy
language). The Facebook litigation is still pending at the trial court level, so there has been
no judicial resolution of the interpretive issues in that case.
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FIGURE 1. SUMMARY RESULTS
Each dot represents the proportion of respondents who chose the
first interpretation. The statistical tests we conducted are represented
by the 95% confidence interval surrounding these point estimates. It is
striking that none of the survey results show respondents dividing
evenly between the interpretations. (This can be seen by the fact that
none of the confidence intervals cross the 0.5 line.) In addition, the X
dots represent the ratio of respondents who chose “uncertain,” which
varied from 12.5% to 25%.
Each of the cases that inspired the surveys and experiments
above was a tough interpretive nut for courts to crack. Each case
proved hard enough to warrant appellate litigation that involved
reversals of lower court interpretations. Some judges drew on lay intu-
itions that were not backed by fully developed evidential records.
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Others drew on interpretive canons that have little to do with how
most people read texts.
Sometimes, the judiciary’s judgments were entirely consistent
with the respondents’ majority. This was the result in Moore’s dissent
as well as in Andersen, Cambridge, and Yahoo (where courts and
respondents agreed the language was unambiguous). But the Moore
majority, Vargas, Storybook, and Google missed the mark compared
to the majority of respondents’ understanding. The Storybook bonus
case is the most striking, because the court embraced an unambiguous
meaning of words that was opposite to the jury’s interpretation,166 and
we found that a resounding majority among our respondents agreed
with the jury. The Google court held that privacy policy language was
too ambiguous to secure user consent to content analysis of their
emails,167 but respondents who read the policy language overwhelm-
ingly disagreed. We could see the clash between the court and the
survey respondents in Storybook coming, but the Moore and the
Google results took us by surprise, indicating that shifting to the con-
sumer survey methodology would not only change the process of
interpreting contracts but would at least occasionally change the sub-
stantive interpretations of contracts as well.
If the heterogeneity of the response data in our sample shows us
anything, it is that individual judgments and responses can be quirky
and mystifying, but majoritarian judgments about contractual
meaning are comprehensible. However anecdotal, our surveys begin
to demonstrate that respondents are good at identifying ambiguity
when it clearly exists, and that they shift in the right direction when
the language is made clearer through experimental manipulations.
Importantly, they are not inevitably biased against business parties.
Further research is necessary to identify with precision how surveys
differ systematically from court interpretation. But our purpose in this
series of experiments was to demonstrate the plausibility and practi-
cality of the survey interpretation method.
As we turn to Part IV, in which we discuss the normative justifi-
cations for the survey interpretation method, the contrasts between
judicial and lay interpretations raise a profound question. Is it prefer-
able to base the binding meaning of consumer contracts on the
majoritarian understanding of those texts rather than judicial interpre-
tations? Are the intuitions of like transactors a better yardstick than
the professional judgments of courts that are based on prior prece-
166 Storybook Homes, Inc. v. Carlson, 312 N.E.2d 27, 29–30 (Ill. App. Ct. 1974).
167 In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430, 2013 WL 5423918, at *14 (N.D.
Cal. Sept. 26, 2013).
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dents, policy considerations, interpretive canons, or judicial assess-
ments of parties’ purposes?
IV
THE CASE FOR SURVEY INTERPRETATION
Parts II and III presented a novel approach to contract interpre-
tation that would potentially overcome the problems that Part I iden-
tified with existing doctrine. The focus of Parts II and III was
descriptive. They intended to answer the question whether the survey
interpretation method is feasible. To that end, Part II described how
the new system would work and the wide reception and success it had
in the neighboring areas of trademark and unfair competition law.
And Part III reported the findings of a pilot experiment, in which we
implemented the proposed regime in a variety of old interpretation
challenges and obtained promising results.
We now turn to the question that is perhaps the most funda-
mental: Why survey interpretation? It is not enough to show that the
method is feasible, nor (as we will argue later) that it avoids doctrinal
knots. The survey interpretation method is a significant change to the
practice of contract interpretation, and it needs to be justified.
In this Part, we present a normative defense of the survey inter-
pretation method, based on several arguments. First, interpretations
based on surveys further the goal of giving a text the understanding
assigned by those for whom the text was written. Second, survey-
based interpretation in many—or perhaps even most—cases will be
cheaper than existing interpretive approaches. Third, survey-based
interpretation would render the interpretation of contracts more pre-
dictable. Fourth, it would displace “normative interpretation.” And
fifth, the survey interpretation method may have beneficial dynamic
effects, resulting in the simplification of contract terms.
A. Enforce the Terms People Expect
The core of the normative case for using the survey interpretation
method is straightforward: Contracts should have the meaning that
the parties to the transaction assign to the text.168 It is pointless to ask
the actual parties in the litigation what the text meant to them when
they formed the contract, because they will bend their answers to fit
their litigation goals. So the law should instead ask disinterested
people just like them.
168 See, e.g., Opals on Ice Lingerie v. Bodylines, Inc., 320 F.3d 362, 372 (2d. Cir. 2003)
(holding that a “meeting of the minds” is the fundamental basis of a valid, enforceable
contract).
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The case for the survey interpretation method is pronounced
when this method yields a meaning that differs from the existing
method, with its reliance on legally trained interpretation. A con-
sumer, employment, or insurance contract is written for lay people,
not experts, and the meaning of its provisions should be determined
by its lay, not sophisticated, understanding. A commercial contract is
written for merchants, and its meaning should be determined by sur-
veying people in the trade, harnessing their industry-specific literacy.
And a sophisticated drafted-from-scratch contract is written by and
for the attorneys on each side, and thus other like professionals should
be polled to determine the meaning.
Let us focus on mass contracts that govern transactions with lay
people for the moment. It might be thought that, unlike trademarks
and advertising messages, standard contract terms are not written for
the lay person. Surely, most people do not pay attention to boiler-
plate; why should they be surveyed as to its meaning? The primary
answer (albeit disappointingly simple) is: It’s the law! This criterion—
how an ordinary recipient of a contractual message would understand
it—is a touchstone of contract law, used to determine the meaning of
precontractual representations, offers, and contractual terms. “[W]e
give words their ‘ordinary meaning,’ viewing the subject of the con-
tract ‘as the mass of mankind would view it.’”169
Courts routinely recognize that they ought to uncover the
meaning that lay parties would assign to the language, working to put
themselves in the shoes of the non-legally trained.170 But can judges
truly set aside the influences of their prior knowledge and expertise
and imagine what a term means to non-experts? As one court
observed, trial judges—with background, knowledge, and experience
unlike that of most consumers—are hardly in a position to understand
consumer-facing communications the same way that consumers do.171
The survey method would help courts overcome such cognitive and
information biases.
Compare this crowdsourcing method of interpretation to the
existing legalistic alternative, which relies on technical canons of inter-
pretation. The use of some of these archaic techniques has fortunately
subsided over time, but they are still a central feature of court-
centered interpretation. Some canons are intuitive and might be fol-
169 All-Ways Logistics, Inc. v. USA Truck, Inc. 583 F.3d 511, 516 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting
Coleman v. Regions Bank, 216 S.W.3d 569, 574 (Ark. 2005)).
170 See, e.g., Bristol West Ins. Co. v. Wawanesa Mut. Ins. Co., 570 F.3d 461, 464 (1st Cir.
2009); Sargent Constr. Co. v. State Auto Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 1324, 1327 (8th Cir. 1994).
171 Verizon Directories Corp. v. Yellow Book USA, Inc., 309 F. Supp. 2d 401, 407
(E.D.N.Y. 2004).
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lowed by survey respondents. Others, like the last antecedent clause
rule (relative and qualifying words or phrases are to be applied only to
the words or phrases that immediately precede them),172 ejusdem
generis (the meaning of the word is interpreted by the company it
keeps),173 or expressio unius est exclusio alterus (to express or include
one thing implies the exclusion of another),174 are more technical and
might not resonate at all with the ways lay people interpret texts.
Indeed, there is an accumulating body of evidence to suggest that
interpretive canons are foreign not only to naı¨ve laypeople but to
sophisticates as well. Capitol Hill staffers who draft laws are often
unfamiliar with the interpretive canons courts use to assess their hand-
iwork.175 More troublingly, recent qualitative work suggests that
courts interpreting choice of law clauses in contracts often apply
canons that even the lawyers who negotiate these clauses do not
expect them to use, resulting in interpretations that are at odds with
what scores of lawyers said their clients intended.176
Even in those rare instances where a contract interpretation case
goes to a jury—which is existing law’s best attempt to uncover the
meaning that the “mass of mankind” gives to the contract—the out-
come is inferior to the survey method. First, the larger “N” in the
survey reduces the variance and enhances the validity of the sample as
a representation of the population at large. More subtly, because
jurors get to deliberate, they are not representative and are not
independent “draws.” Consumers reading a contract do not delib-
erate, but rather follow a more expeditious thought process, which is
better simulated by survey respondents. If they ever read the text,
consumers do it alone, not with eleven other people in the room.
Group deliberations, as conducted by juries, are known to lead
172 See, e.g., Stewman Ranch, Inc. v. Double M. Ranch, Ltd., 192 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex.
App. 2006).
173 See, e.g., Aspen Advisors LLC v. United Artists Theatre Co., 861 A.2d 1251, 1265
(Del. 2004); 242-44 E. 77th St. Greater N.Y. Mut. Ins. Co., 815 N.Y.S.2d 507, 510 (App.
Div. 2006) (explaining that when a general provision follows a series of specific provisions,
the general provision is interpreted as being of the same type or class as the specific
provisions that preceded it).
174 See, e.g., Mastrocovo v. Capizzi, 930 N.Y.S.2d 141, 142 (App. Div. 2011).
175 Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 926–29 (2013).
176 Coyle, supra note 95, at 696–701.
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towards polarization,177 often according some jurors disproportionate
influence.178 Surveys dodge this problem.
The survey interpretation method cannot ensure that every party
to a contract gets the deal that he or she expected, had they read the
terms. People are too heterogeneous and problems of proof are too
significant for any reform to achieve that goal. Yet the method can
ensure that most parties to an agreement are receiving the terms that
they expected or that they would have expected had they taken the
time to read and digest the terms of the agreement. That strikes us as
a significant benefit regardless of whether it is couched in deontolog-
ical terms that emphasize individual autonomy or consequentialist
terms that emphasize the value of Pareto-improving bargains.
B. Costs of Interpretation
Interpretation of contractual text may be the most frequent
ground for dispute in contract law.179 These disputes are costly, in part
because they require courts to determine what extrinsic evidence to
consult (and then to consult it), but primarily because they drain
expensive lawyer time.180
Survey interpretation is becoming increasingly cheap. In the past,
a major criticism of surveys in trademark litigation was their cost.181
177 See Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir, Judicial Decision-Making: A Behavioral
Perspective, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 664,
677 (Doron Teichman & Eyal Zamir eds., 2014). See generally Cass R. Sunstein,
Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71 (2000) (investigating
the phenomenon of group polarization).
178 See, e.g., Erin York Cornwall & Valerie P. Hans, Representation Through
Participation: A Multilevel Analysis of Jury Deliberations, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 667
(2011) (confirming that social status affects participation in jury deliberations); Nancy S.
Marder, Note, Gender Dynamics and Jury Deliberations, 96 YALE L.J. 593, 594–98 (1987)
(finding that women generally have lower participation rates in jury deliberations than
men).
179 See generally Jeffrey M. Lipshaw, Metaphors, Models, and Meaning in Contract Law,
116 PA. ST. L. REV. 987, 989 (2012) (“[I]t is a fair observation that only a tiny portion of
the first-year contracts course involves the issue of contract interpretation. Yet
practitioners know that the real world of contracts is almost exclusively about negotiating
and writing documents and perhaps interpreting them later (whether or not they get
litigated).”).
180 For a discussion of the costs of contract interpretation and the disputes arising
therefrom, see Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83
TEX. L. REV. 1581, 1590–96, 1612–14 (2005).
181 See Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 44, at 2061 (arguing that cost might lead
“[c]lients who may benefit from surveys” to be “potentially priced out of court”); see also
Heymann, supra note 64 (“The effect of a survey in a trademark case is as much about
which party has the resources to fully commit to the survey process as it is about a search
for the truth about consumer perception.”); Thornburg, supra note 47, at 717 (“[C]urrent
survey experts in California charge between $450 to $600 per hour and require support
staff billing at rates ranging between $200 to $300 in orchestrating the actual surveys.”).
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The International Trademark Association, for example, reported the
cost of surveys to be in the $25,000 to $150,000 range.182 But the rise
of online panel surveys promises a significant reduction in the cost of
conducting surveys.183 Online surveys are quicker, less expensive, and
can reach a population of consumers that is demographically repre-
sentative and nationally dispersed, avoiding the costs of annoying
people who do not wish to be surveyed.184 Reputable online panels
provide sufficient compensation to respondents to ensure serious and
meaningful responses.185 Online surveys have the distinct advantage
of allowing respondents to examine visual stimuli and texts with ade-
quate time to ponder what they see.186 The selection of the respon-
dent panels is fully transparent, conducted by survey firms that stake
their business reputations on doing it right. Perhaps most surprising is
the finding that online surveys obtain substantive results that are sta-
tistically equivalent to those obtained under more traditional survey
modes.187
Once contract language is tested and its meaning validated via
surveys, it could be replicated widely within an industry. As it stands,
law firms and lawyers often use the same boilerplate language for
multiple clients involved with similar deals. Sometimes the boiler-
plate’s meaning has been adjudicated, but often it has not. When such
language is adjudicated via ordinary methods, costly surprises some-
times ensue. Having pretested language and discerned its likely
meaning for consumers, a law firm might advise multiple clients to use
the same boilerplate. In that way, the already reasonable costs of con-
ducting surveys could be distributed.
182 INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, supra note 76, at 5; see also Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, The
Google Shortcut to Trademark Law, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 351, 361 n.53 (2014) (quoting a
contemporary statement from a practitioner that trademark surveys typically cost $75,000
to $150,000 in a case).
183 The online survey firms we used for the experiments reported in Part III charge
$3.25 per respondent, for a fifteen to twenty minute survey. Telephone interviews, by
contrast, cost on average $20 per respondent. See Karin Braunsberger et al., A Comparison
of Reliability Between Telephone and Web-Based Surveys, 60 J. BUS. RES. 758, 763–64
(2007) (concluding that the cost of each web-based survey amounted to only 29% of the
cost of each telephone survey).
184 Hal Poret, A Comparative Empirical Analysis of Online Versus Mall and Phone
Methodologies for Trademark Surveys, 100 TRADEMARK REP. 756, 757 (2010).
185 Unlike the respondents contacted by phone or while shopping in malls, they are not
being asked to donate their time.
186 See, e.g., Muha v. Encore Receivable Mgmt., Inc., 558 F.3d 623, 626 (7th Cir. 2009)
(“[A] telephone survey is not an ideal method of testing the understanding of a written
statement, since inflection can alter meaning and some written statements are easier to
understand when read than when heard.”).
187 Poret, supra note 184, at 807.
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Low survey costs make the method more attractive, but also
easier to manipulate. As the costs of conducting online surveys
decline, the danger increases that a party will try out multiple versions
of surveys, cherry pick the most favorable results, and bury the less
favorable ones. There are charlatans operating in the trademark litiga-
tion landscape “who can essentially create a survey to show any
desired finding . . . by either creating a skewed line of questioning or
numerical manipulation of already acquired data.”188 In some
instances, presenting survey respondents with longer excerpts from a
contract may alter the results, and disputes will arise between the par-
ties as to how much contractual text and context needs to be
presented to the respondents. In that sense, battles over the survey
interpretation methodology would inevitably replace some existing
fights over the scope of extrinsic evidence that ought to be admitted.
But the aggregate costs will be reduced—because the question is now
simpler—the methodological question of how to best capture the ordi-
nary lay meaning, rather than the normative question of what is a rea-
sonable interpretation.
As we discussed in Part II above, the use of neutral experts
chosen either by the court or in the contract also would help address
the biased survey design problem.189 One attractive aspect of the
survey method under the adversarial system is that it promotes imme-
diate replication, and experts whose findings consistently were outliers
might suffer reputational damage. Beyond that, we would anticipate
an accumulation over time of a kind of common law of survey inter-
pretation, as we see in the area of trademark surveys.190
Discovery rules may further alleviate the cherry-picking problem.
Litigants’ efforts to hide disappointing survey results have to be foiled,
and what better way to do it than to make various versions of contrac-
tual language that were actually tested fair game in civil discovery?
We might worry about a chilling effect—the possibility that discovery
might diminish the propensity of drafters to employ the method. But
the risk that discovery poses can be overcome if drafters pre-test the
language prior to the contract and use only versions that perform well
in such testing.
188 Thornburg, supra note 83, at 97; see also MCCARTHY, supra note 43, at § 32:179
(discussing protection of surveys from discovery); Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 44, at
2059 (finding evidence of attorneys who collected surveys and buried those with bad
results).
189 See Scott v. City of New York, 591 F. Supp. 2d 554, 560 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), for an
example of the mediation approach in action. See also Welter, supra note 111, at 209
(explaining that survey results are more likely to be accepted by both parties if the court
appointed a neutral expert to conduct the survey).
190 See supra text accompanying notes 75–76.
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Even low-cost online surveys may be too expensive for non-rep-
resented plaintiffs bringing small claims. Such disputes rarely involve
contract interpretation battles because the contract underlying the dis-
pute is usually in standard form and unambiguously favors the
drafting party. In the rare case where the result of a small claim turns
on the meaning of the boilerplate, we think the use of surveys should
be exempted. But in general, consumer complaints are solved either
via less formal settings (e.g., arbitration or online dispute resolution),
or in a highly formal class action procedure. Long and costly interpre-
tation fights take place in the latter, and the survey method would
only make these battles cheaper.
C. The End of “Normative” Interpretation
Delegating interpretation of contracts to surveys would advance
largely textual interpretations assigned by “the mass of mankind,” but
it would at the same time oust interpretations based on non-textual
approaches. Interpretation doctrine sometimes tries to do more than
elicit the literal or plain meaning. Courts sometimes try to look for the
purpose of the parties (under the premise that such common purpose
exists).191 Or, if a term may be consistent with two reasonable mean-
ings, courts use interpretation doctrine to assign liability for such con-
fusion.192 Survey interpretation would thus kill the enterprise of
“normative” interpretation—the practice through which courts infuse
contracts with content that promotes social ends.193
For example, survey interpretation would cripple courts’ ability to
promote economic efficiency by choosing the meaning that minimizes
transaction costs or maximizes the parties’ joint surplus.194 We are not
aware, however, of any evidence that judges currently try to interpret
191 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 202(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (stating
that the “principle purpose” of the parties, if ascertainable, is given great weight).
192 See id. § 201(2) (explaining which party’s interpretation prevails in the event that the
parties have attached different meanings to the same contract term).
193 See, e.g., HUGH COLLINS, REGULATING CONTRACTS 171, 232–34 (1999) (arguing for
contract interpretation that serves goals of cooperation, flexibility, and distributive justice);
Eyal Zamir, The Inverted Hierarchy of Contract Interpretation and Supplementation, 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1710, 1777–88 (1997) (arguing that contract interpretation serves social
goals).
194 See, e.g., George Cohen, Interpretation and Implied Terms in Contract Law, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 125 (Gerrit De Geest ed., 2d ed. 2011); Juliet P.
Kostritsky, Interpretive Risk and Contract Interpretation: A Suggested Approach for
Maximizing Value, 2 ELON L. REV. 109, 135–37 (2011) (arguing that judicial intervention
in a contract dispute should not be precluded if court enforcement would be welfare
improving); Lipshaw, supra note 179, at 1019 (“All seem to agree that the normative goal
of contract law generally is to enhance economic welfare by maximizing the joint economic
surplus that arises from the transaction.”); Posner, supra note 180, at 1583 (arguing that the
goal of contract interpretation is to minimize transaction costs).
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contracts in a welfare-maximizing manner, let alone succeed at doing
so. Nor do we believe that courts have the kind of information neces-
sary to advance this goal. Would parties, in the name of “efficiency,”
want to engage in complex litigation over how to maximize joint wel-
fare? Moreover, many interpretation disputes involve purely distribu-
tive aspects of the transaction, which (by definition) cannot be
resolved via the welfare maximizing principle.195 Thus, it is unlikely
that the survey interpretation method would resolve disputes in a sys-
tematically less efficient manner.
There are other normative goals that courts are urged to advance
in the course of resolving interpretation disputes, such as favoring
weak parties, punishing drafting sloppiness, and promoting external
societal interests. No doubt, yielding to survey results would make it
harder to advance these goals. If courts, for example, want to favor
the meaning given by a protected group, they would have to rely on
carefully selected samples to elicit this meaning. Even when a
common meaning is verified, courts may want to advance a different
meaning for good reasons. Under the survey method, such normative
preferences could no longer pretend to be “interpretation” and other
doctrinal levers would have to be candidly relied upon to advance
them.
Still, in a great majority of cases courts do search for the plain
and ordinary meaning. And even if this plain meaning is only the
baseline for further inquiry and normative interpretation, the survey
method can help establish it. Courts can rely on a survey to show that
two meanings are equally plausible, opening the door for second-
order criteria to determine which party prevails.
Ultimately, any objection to the survey interpretation method on
the basis that it would spell the end of normative contract interpreta-
tion assumes that normative interpretation is actually practiced—a
quixotic assumption with little empirical basis. Courts have neither the
information nor the motivation to use contract interpretation disputes
as a regular platform for social reform, hence their declared commit-
ment to interpreting the contractual text “as the mass of mankind
would view it.” The survey method is therefore at odds, not with the
ongoing practice of contract interpretation, but primarily with aca-
demic hopes for a normative enterprise of interpretation.
195 Omri Ben-Shahar, A Bargaining Power Theory of Default Rules, 109 COLUM. L.
REV. 396, 396 (2009).
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D. Simplifying the Contracts
The survey interpretation method, we said, could lower litigation
costs, because it would rely less on the interpretive discretion of
courts. For this to be accomplished, surveys would have to focus pri-
marily on the plain meaning of the text, without presenting respon-
dents with rich accounts of context. This sparseness would make it
easier for drafters to predict what contractual language would be held
to mean in the event of litigation.
Survey respondents would likely be presented with a snippet of
the relevant text of the agreement and only a minimal amount of sur-
rounding information.196 Respondents are not compensated, sophisti-
cated, or patient enough to attentively read detailed descriptions of
the background facts and long excerpts of the boilerplate. Besides,
context-rich survey questions would defeat an important goal of the
method. They would require courts to determine how much extrinsic
evidence to put in front of the respondents. But a primary goal of the
survey interpretation method is precisely to avoid the endless adver-
sarial fights over the scope of evidence.
When surveys rely on large samples of random respondents, we
envision a presentation of the interpretive questions in a relatively
bare format. Brevity was indeed one of the primary constraints we
adhered to in designing the pilot surveys reported in Part III, which
were all directed at lay respondents. In such surveys, the contractual
texts and the competing interpretations would be presented to respon-
dents stripped of additional facts regarding such matters as extrinsic
communications between the parties, the norms that permeate in the
trade, or the course of dealing and performance surrounding this con-
tract. It is possible, of course, to run surveys with rich information
about context, but the parties may disagree about the context—for
example, about what was said in the precontractual communica-
tions—and thus choosing to present an interpretation survey that
exposes the respondents to disputed context may run the risk of the
court discounting its probative weight. Ultimately, the utility of the
survey interpretation method as a litigation-simplifying device would
be enhanced if courts were to endorse relatively context-free surveys.
This relatively context-free approach to interpretation would
have a desirable effect on the simplicity of contracts. Firms would
196 In instances where consumers are given no contractual text, and only asked about
their expectations, context and normative preferences are doing essentially all the work in
guiding respondents’ non-random responses. In some instances, these sorts of expectations
about the terms of a contract differ substantially from the reality. See, e.g., Boardman,
supra note 39, at 1082–84 (documenting common misconceptions held by consumers about
the scope of their homeowners insurance).
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want to draft simpler contracts with less cryptic jargon so as to
increase their ability to predict how interpretive battles would come
out. In the era of digital contracting it has become all the more
costless for drafters to err on the side of verbosity; for example, we
recently read United Airlines’s 35,000-word passenger contract—a
paragon of the digital consumer contract, yet found some striking
ambiguities.197 Even firms that try heroically to use lay language fall
back on technical and lengthy legalese when dealing with weighty
matters.198 These incentives for excess and complexity would be con-
strained if the language has to be understood by lay readers who
determine its interpretation. Drafters of agreements would have to
consider how average respondents not trained in legal subtlety would
read and understand the terms in a future survey. No longer able to
rely on professional judges riding interpretive canons to the rescue
(while reading between the lines), drafters’ best strategy would be to
write clearly. Various regulatory efforts prompt firms to do just
that,199 but without giving real incentive. The survey method could
create the desired incentives for simplicity.
That said, there is one countervailing effect that justifies a caveat.
For reasons we have already explained, we think it is more method-
ologically defensible to have survey respondents read the relevant
excerpts of contracts rather than the entire contracts. If our approach
becomes law we might see firms lengthen contracts. Rather than
writing broad, abstract boilerplate that addresses a great many contin-
gencies, they could decide that they want to draft narrower but clearer
clauses—and lots of them. Contract complexity and contract length
both undermine the ability of consumers to read and comprehend the
terms of their agreements at the time of contract formation. We
believe the clarity benefits of our approach outweigh the potential
contract length downsides, but that would ultimately be an empirical
question to be assessed after implementation.
197 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Lior J. Strahilevitz, David Dao v. United: What Does The
Airline Contract Say?, FORBES (Apr. 14, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/omribensha
har/2017/04/14/david-dao-versus-united-what-does-the-airline-contract-say/#2ee0894c18ad.
198 See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 124–26 (explaining the tension
between simplicity of contractual language and full disclosure).
199 For example, the Truth in Lending Act requires credit card issuers to disclose terms
“clearly and conspicuously,” though there has been significant confusion over what sorts of
disclosures will satisfy that standard. Brandon Mohr, Who Decides Whether Clarity Is
Clear?: An Analysis of TILA’s Clarity of Disclosure Requirement in Actions by Consumers
Against Credit Card Companies, 32 PACE L. REV. 188, 188–89 (2012).
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In any event, we don’t want to overstate the value of simplifica-
tion. Only very few consumers ever read the boilerplate200—ratios so
microscopic that it is naı¨ve to imagine that shorter boilerplate would
become widely read. Yet for the occasional readers, the stakes of the
transaction are perhaps idiosyncratically high, and making it easier for
this small group to understand their contracts without forcing them to
retain counsel is a benefit. The benefits of simplification may be even
larger when consumers turn to information intermediaries when
entering contracts. Homebuyers and sellers, for example, typically
seek advice of real estate agents rather than lawyers. Consumers rely
on services that rate or grade contractual aspects like privacy and war-
ranties. And they often read prominent statements regarding with-
drawal rights and termination penalties. In these situations, making
the language more readily comprehensible could have benefits even
for people who do not bother to read the fine print.
Another aspect of simplification is predictability. The survey
method would make the interpretation of a contract more predictable
ex ante, because it is based on a method that can be replicated—and
pre-tested. Currently, parties who seek greater predictability have to
deploy contract language that has already been interpreted by a court
in the relevant jurisdiction, but such case law often does not exist.
Even if it exists, different judges may respond to precedents differ-
ently, so in the event of litigation a lot could depend on the identity of
the trial court judge whose rulings will prove dispositive. The survey
method liberates the parties from such constraints. We argue in Part V
below that by employing the kinds of experiments we described in
Part III, contracting parties may be able to field test the meaning of
terms before the agreement, or after the agreement but before
engaging in the bargained-for conduct, all to identify ambiguities and
resolve them. Basing the meaning of a contract on the responses of a
nationally representative sample of consumers lets contract drafters
identify litigation risk and plan accordingly. Thus, rather than await
the dispute and its uncertain resolution, parties can predict the legal
outcome by applying the survey method privately.
Other interpretive tools provide far less predictability—interpre-
tive canons are contradictory, and policy judgments about efficient
terms are made amidst great uncertainty and require subjective judg-
ments by courts that may vary based on judge’s policy preferences. By
contrast, there is evidence suggesting that survey responses to inter-
200 See BEN-SHAHAR & SCHNEIDER, supra note 13, at 107 (2014) (identifying obstacles
to the effectiveness of disclosures, such as illiteracy and the overload problem).
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pretive questions will be stable over time.201 This added predictability
afforded by the survey interpretation method could increase drafting
flexibility and promote innovation. One of the striking features of
contractual boilerplates is their rigidity and stickiness. In a legal
regime that relies on court interpretation, the parties prefer to cut and
paste existing clauses that were already interpreted by courts and have
acquired clear and predictable meaning.202 Switching to new language,
even if more suitable to the evolving circumstances, introduces a new
interpretation risk that would only be resolved later, through further
rounds of litigation. Insurance companies, for example, often prefer to
stick with existing boilerplate that was interpreted by courts against
them rather than redraft the policies, because that language is no
longer ambiguous.203 Survey interpretation—by allowing firms to
resolve the uncertainty prior to litigation—can foster greater drafting
flexibility.204
E. Uncovering Sophisticated Meaning
Our “as the mass of mankind” rationale for the survey interpreta-
tion method envisions a consumer contract, drafted unilaterally by a
sophisticated party and disseminated to many lay parties. But a
variant of the method is potentially well suited to more sophisticated
contracting environments, like merchant-to-merchant contracts and
negotiated agreements between firms. Here, too, courts are often at a
disadvantage relative to surveyed parties. Unlike the consumer con-
text, where courts are more sophisticated than the transactors, in the
201 See Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Myth of Fourth Amendment
Circularity, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 1747, 1760 (2017) (explaining that the public’s beliefs about
privacy remain relatively stable over time, despite major changes in the law).
202 See generally GULATI & SCOTT, supra note 96, at 33–44; Omri Ben-Shahar & John
A. E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006)
(explaining the appeal of using default rules rather than opt-out provisions).
203 See Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 176, 179 (Omri
Ben-Shahar ed., 2007) (“Not only does past language become clearer over time in the
insurer’s eyes, but the cost of each clause also becomes increasingly clear as actuarial data
is collected and pooled. Changing language, even in an effort to decrease coverage, could
be more costly.”); Boardman, supra note 39, at 1105–06 (explaining that drafting new
language is risky for insurers because there is no guarantee that it will be read as intended).
204 Some contracts are aimed not only at the parties to them but to third parties as well.
For example, the contract between an owner of vacant commercial property and a
construction firm might affect various aspects of the relationship between the construction
firm and its subcontractors on the project. Other contracts, like home mortgage
agreements, may be written with an eye towards subsequent securitization. In these
instances, we would expect that the sophisticated third parties (who are evaluating other
contracts in an environment characterized by repeat play) will develop similar expertise to
that developed by the sophisticated contracting parties themselves.
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business-to-business context courts may be insufficiently fluent in the
sector’s lingo. They could benefit from the crowd-sourced knowledge
that a survey would furnish.
In these settings, the universe of potential survey respondents has
to be adjusted to include merchants, lawyers, and other profes-
sionals—respondents who have more insight as to the meaning of the
contract. Suppose a dispute arises in the construction or advertising
industries. Insiders will not be hard to find. Admittedly, as compared
with consumer contracts, it would be harder to recruit neutral respon-
dents (especially if many “insiders” have a stake in how the interpre-
tive battle is resolved), and the size of the survey would have to be
smaller. One might worry that respondents in merchant markets will
provide self-serving answers in an attempt to steer legal standards to
their favor. Hopefully, a clever design of the survey instrument could
defeat this bias by obscuring the stakes and using random variation in
phrasing to make it less obvious to respondents who would benefit
from a particular interpretation. It would surely do better than the
alternative methods of learning about trade usages and interpreta-
tions, which all too often rely on testimony by insiders who are fre-
quently parties to the litigation.205
Interpreting negotiated contracts would require surveying law-
yers—probably the only professionals working on such deals that
understand the meaning of the legal terms. The survey would have to
assemble a reasonably large number of transactional lawyers and
gather their interpretations. This would not necessarily entail paying
each lawyer their billable rate. For example, a firm seeking to resolve
ambiguities might offer a free CLE program to lawyers in which their
interpretations of text are initially collected. Then, the lawyers run-
ning the CLE would inform the lawyers in attendance of what con-
sensus interpretations emerged from the survey and what, if anything,
the relevant precedents say about similar language. Although one
might like to suppose that lawyers follow the latest contract interpre-
tation decisions closely, some evidence suggests that lawyers’ supposi-
tions when drafting agreements can be sticky and out of step with
what courts are doing,206 suggesting that reliance on the survey inter-
pretation method may have many of the benefits described above as
well.
205 See Lisa Bernstein, Custom in the Courts, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 78–79 (2015)
(explaining that among a set of cases studied, the most common type of usage evidence
introduced was the testimony of a party or a party’s employee).
206 Coyle, supra note 95, at 639 (explaining that drafting new language is risky for
insurers because there is no guarantee that it will be read as intended).
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Although we think of consumer contracts as our core case, there
are significant advantages to interpretive consistency across contract
types. Making surveys relevant for contracts of all sorts takes some
pressure off the determinations that courts would have to make in
boundary cases, such as employment agreements and insurance con-
tracts that are regulated by the state. That said, because different con-
texts call for different kinds of surveys, some judgment calls would
persist, and uncertainty about how those judgments would be resolved
will impose costs on the parties. The relevant question, of course, is
how these costs compare to those engendered by the substantial
uncertainty that presently exists in contract interpretation.
V
THE DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE SURVEY
INTERPRETATION METHOD
Part IV argued that the survey interpretation method presented
in Part II and tested out in Part III has distinct desirable attributes.
We argued that abandoning the present method of interpretation,
which depends on jurists interpreting language rather than relying on
the understanding of those the contract is intended to bind, and
replacing it with surveys would simplify litigation and align contrac-
tual meaning with reasonable expectations.
Our exercise so far highlighted the difference between the pro-
posed survey interpretation method and the traditional interpretation
jurisprudence. In this Part, we reverse the lens. Rather than showing
how different the two regimes are, we show some common DNA. We
argue that the survey interpretation method is consistent with several
principles and doctrines of contract law. We do this in two steps. First,
we identify traces of openness in courts to the survey method, which
suggest that the method’s expansion to contract interpretation might
be embraced. Second, we argue that contract law permits parties to
opt into the survey method by agreeing in the contract that any future
interpretation dispute would be resolved by surveys.
A. The Survey Method in Courts
To imagine how courts would view the survey method in contract
interpretation, it is worth recalling how the method became so promi-
nent in trademark litigation. As we noted at the outset, efforts to
introduce surveys into evidence initially ran aground of the hearsay
exception207 and judicial skepticism as to whether such surveys could
207 See Elgin Nat’l Watch Co. v. Elgin Clock Co., 26 F.2d 376, 377–78 (D. Del. 1928)
(rejecting lawyer’s attempt to introduce an expert-conducted consumer survey on the basis
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be accurate.208 Within a few decades, the opposition to consumer
survey evidence had been overcome.209 And whatever concerns
judges may have initially had about the use of online surveys in trade-
mark litigation dissolved quickly enough210—so much so that it is now
considered an abuse of discretion to exclude even an online survey on
the grounds that it does not “replicate real world conditions.”211 The
use of surveys, and in particular low-cost online surveys, is so widely
accepted (and expected) that courts no longer bother to justify this
practice.212
It is easy to see why surveys so naturally fit trademark and adver-
tising law litigation. The fundamental question in these cases is how
the intended lay audience understood and interpreted a particular
communication. Since the goal is to figure out consumers’ perceptions
and beliefs, what better way than to ask them?213 It might be thought
that interpreting a contract is unlike the inquiry into a likelihood of
consumer confusion. Interpretation tries to track the meaning that the
parties to this contract gave to the language they used, not necessarily
the meaning that survey respondents would give. Moreover, interpre-
tation is widely thought of as a legal filter that does more than deci-
pher lay meaning; it is a tool for courts to regulate incentives to draft,
comply with, enforce, and litigate contractual rights.214 And indeed, so
of the hearsay rules, insisting that the court could only accept evidence from consumers
who would testify personally in open court).
208 See Du Pont Cellophane Co. v. Waxed Prods. Co., 6 F. Supp. 859, 884–85 (E.D.N.Y.
1934) (holding that the survey is not “competent, material, or relevant”), modified on other
grounds, 85 F.2d 75, 80 (2d Cir. 1936).
209 See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imps., Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 680, 686 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)
(admitting a consumer survey as evidence in a trademark case).
210 See, e.g., Bach v. Forever Living Prods. U.S., Inc., 473 F. Supp. 2d 1110, 1115–16
(W.D. Wash. 2007) (holding that defendants may challenge the reliability of the survey, but
not its admissibility).
211 Fortune Dynamic, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores Brand Mgmt., 618 F.3d 1025,
1037–38 (9th Cir. 2010).
212 See POM Wonderful LLC v. Organic Juice USA, Inc., 769 F. Supp. 2d 188, 199–201
(S.D.N.Y. 2011) (admitting surveys despite alleged methodological flaws). The leading
trademark law treatise says flatly that, “[i]f a survey conducted using the internet is
performed according to the generally accepted principles of surveying, then it should be
admitted into evidence and evaluated the same as any other survey results.” MCCARTHY,
supra note 43, at § 32:165.25.
213 See Robert C. Bird, Streamlining Consumer Survey Analysis: An Examination of the
Concept of Universe in Consumer Surveys Offered in Intellectual Property Litigation, 88
TRADEMARK REP. 269, 270 (1998) (“A consumer survey is a scientific method of
presenting evidence of mental associations of a given group of people . . . .”).
214 See Omri Ben-Shahar, The Tentative Case Against Flexibility in Commercial Law, 66
U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 783–84 (1999) (analyzing how the U.C.C.’s non-formalist interpretive
approach shapes the business practices of contracting parties); Eric A. Posner, The Parol
Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 533, 533 (1998) (stating that a court should apply a default or “gap-
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goes the objection, surveys are rarely if ever used in contract litigation
for precisely these reasons.
Not so fast. Courts increasingly think that surveys are useful even
beyond the likelihood-of-confusion context. Under Rule 703 in the
Federal Rules of Evidence, surveys are admissible whenever their
presentation has a “probative value [in helping the jury evaluate the
opinion that] substantially outweighs any prejudicial effect.”215 It is
this probative effect that is prompting courts to be increasingly recep-
tive to, and even to demand, survey evidence. For example, a frequent
question that arises in insurance contract litigation is the following:
What reasonable expectations did a promise evoke?216 Contracting
parties claim that their reasonable expectations ought to be
enforced—and courts willing to enforce such expectations are increas-
ingly calling for surveys to establish the existence and content of the
expectations.217 Or, under the doctrine of unconscionability, courts
have to determine, among other things, whether a term is surprising
and unexpected to the typical consumer.218 Under the American Law
Institute’s proposed Restatement of Consumer Contracts, this can be
shown by survey evidence.219
Surveys are also useful in administering another contract inter-
pretation doctrine—trade usage—that requires courts to interpret
contracts and fill gaps by looking at practices regularly observed by
transactors in the relevant market.220 It may not always be true that a
trade usage exists. But what better way to prove its existence and con-
tent than by a survey of parties who ordinarily participate in the rele-
filling rule” that either maximizes the contract’s ex-ante value or provides ex-ante
incentives to disclose sufficient information); Steven Shavell, On the Writing and the
Interpretation of Contracts, 22 J.L. ECON. ORG. 289, 301 (2006) (demonstrating that it may
be optimal not to enforce the “literal” (plain) meaning of a term, so as to save parties
writing costs).
215 See, e.g., United States v. H & R Block, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 2d 27, 30 (D.D.C. 2011).
216 See generally Robert H. Jerry II, Insurance, Contract, and the Doctrine of Reasonable
Expectations, 5 CONN. INS. L.J. 21 (1998) (exploring the doctrine of reasonable
expectations).
217 See Walker v. Life Ins. Co. of the Sw., No. CV 10-9198, 2015 WL 10761819, at *26
(C.D. Cal. Apr. 14, 2015) (holding that consumer surveys could have been, but were not,
used in establishing consumer expectations arising from life insurance policies).
218 See O’Donovan v. CashCall, Inc., 278 F.R.D. 479, 500 (N.D. Cal. 2011) (stating that
in evaluating unconscionability under California law, courts have to determine “the extent
to which a provision is ‘hidden’ or unexpected”).
219 See RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 5 cmt. 6 (AM. LAW INST., Council
Draft No. 3, 2017).
220 See U.C.C. § 1-205 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (stating that usage
of trade, a practice “having such regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to
justify an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the transaction,” should give
meaning to the terms of an agreement).
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vant commerce? If parties contract over “Grade A” chicken,221 a
“breeding” bull,222 or a “sound” horse,223 but later dispute what
quality these adjectives entail, the survey method could harness the
collective experience of merchants buying and selling chicken, bulls,
or horses. If a clear majority interpretation emerges and if the
sincerity of respondents can be trusted, the result should dictate—or
at least inform—the court’s finding.
This is also the view of the U.C.C. “The existence and scope of
such a usage are to be proved as facts,” says the U.C.C.,224 and courts
have thus explicitly endorsed and encouraged the use of proof
methods akin to surveys.225 But these have not always been large
surveys. Instead, a common method of proving trade usage is experts’
testimony, usually qualitative accounts by members of the trade.226
This is a type of survey, but of a small n. Less common but more
reliable is statistical evidence about the regularity of conduct—“fre-
quencies of a given behavior in the trade”—elicited via formal surveys
of merchants.227 To be sure, Lisa Bernstein finds that courts do not
resort to rigorous survey evidence regarding the content or scope of
trade usages. But she views the nonuse of surveys as an unfortunate
failure of the courts to implement the most appropriate and probative
methodology.228
221 Frigaliment Importing Co. v. B.N.S. Int’l Sales Corp., 190 F. Supp. 116, 118
(S.D.N.Y. 1960).
222 Sherwood v. Walker, 33 N.W. 919, 923 (Mich. 1887).
223 Smith v. Hughes (1871) 6 LRQB 597 at 606 (Eng.).
224 U.C.C. § 1-205(2).
225 Compare Lion Oil Trading & Transp., Inc. v. Statoil Mktg. & Trading (US) Inc., No.
08 Civ. 11315, 2011 WL 855876, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2011) (using a “survey of crude oil
traders” to determine a trade usage), and Timeline, Inc. v. ProClarity Corp., No. C05-1013,
2007 WL 1574069, at *8 (W.D. Wash. May 29, 2007) (endorsing, implicitly, the use of
survey evidence in contract interpretation by criticizing an expert trade witness for failing
to “identify any surveys or research he has conducted regarding the meaning or usage of
these terms”), with M.S. Distrib. Co. v. Web Records, Inc., No. 00 C 1436, 2003 WL
21087961, at *12 (N.D. Ill. May 13, 2003) (dismissing survey evidence because the survey’s
methodology was amateurish).
226 FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 471 (noting that under the U.C.C., “[a] party
commonly shows a usage by producing expert witnesses who are familiar with the activity
or place in which the usage is observed”); GREGORY M. TRAVALIO ET AL., NORDSTROM
ON SALES & LEASES OF GOODS 244 (2d ed. 2000) (“[P]resumably expert testimony will be
necessary to establish a trade usage.”).
227 Jody S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt, In Defense of the Incorporation Strategy, in THE
JURISPRUDENTIAL FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW 193, 213 (Jody
S. Kraus & Steven D. Walt eds., 2000).
228 See Bernstein, supra note 205, at 93 (arguing that without a “social scientific survey
. . . it is unclear how the general subjective understanding of transactors across a relevant
market could be reliably established.”).
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Reliable evidence about the content of a custom or behavioral
regularity requires that the people whose opinion is solicited by the
court are representative of the sector of potential parties. In trade-
mark and false advertising cases, experts are careful to survey con-
sumers who say they are in the market for the goods or services at
issue.229 The survey interpretation method for contracts would do
likewise, surveying only those who are potential buyers of camping
equipment in a dispute over the meaning of a North Face sleeping bag
warranty, and surveying a sample of everyone with Internet access in
a dispute over the meaning of Gmail’s terms of service. People in a
position to buy homes, not realtors or mortgage lenders, should inter-
pret residential mortgage notes, and drivers should interpret auto
insurance policies. If this basic alignment is preserved, the survey
method would be entirely consistent with the widely-accepted goal of
interpretation—to identify the meaning that these parties probably
gave to the contract.
* * *
The survey method is a novelty, but it seeks to validate the basic
principles that underlie traditional interpretation practices. Intro-
ducing survey evidence in contract litigation therefore does not
require a retooling of contract doctrine. It requires gradual openness
to more forms of probative evidence. We speculate that adoption of
the survey method would thus proceed incrementally. Initially, courts
might be willing to examine survey evidence as persuasive, not conclu-
sive, evidence. They might rely on survey results to further strengthen
the position towards which they already lean, and perhaps help justify
summary judgments. Why ignore such input altogether? We also think
the survey method is most likely to be adopted in major class action
suits like the Google litigation.230 The stakes would be high enough to
make it sensible for a litigant to invest in an innovative argument, one
that could potentially prove decisive in a complicated case. After such
early successful adoptions, the method could spread, just as it did in
trademark and false advertising law.
229 This is known as the “relevant universe of consumers.” See generally Shashank
Upadhye, Trademark Surveys: Identifying the Relevant Universe of Confused Consumers, 8
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 549 (1998) (explaining how proper
identification of the relevant universe of consumers is critical to the success of a trademark
holder’s infringement case).
230 In re Google Inc. Gmail Litig., No. 13-MD-02430, 2013 WL 5423918 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
26, 2013).
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B. Opting into the Survey Interpretation Method
The previous section explored several threads that may connect
the survey interpretation method with existing interpretive doctrines.
Other than the trade usage and reasonable expectations jurispru-
dence, these connections are admittedly tentative. While we would
like courts to appreciate the value of surveys in providing reliable
interpretation of contracts, so far they have not done so systemati-
cally, in part because lawyers have so far not been encouraging them
to consider survey-related innovations.
The question we now ask is whether courts may be instructed to
use survey interpretation by the parties. Could parties opt into the
survey method? We explore this possibility in two steps. First, we
argue that interpretation doctrine is a default rule that can be con-
tracted around. Second, we identify the rich opportunities that such
customization of interpretation rules might accord the parties.
1. Customizing Interpretation Law
Are interpretation doctrines default rules? In one sense, the
answer must be yes: Interpretation comes into play only when the
contract meaning is not explicit. Drafting clear and explicit meaning
would therefore always override interpreted meaning. But such
drafting would be an overwhelming task, given the endless potential
gaps in contractual language.231 Can the parties, instead, override con-
tract law’s interpretation canon by changing the rules? Can they write
in their contract specific instructions for courts to resolve ambiguities
using different techniques than the ones courts would otherwise
deploy, and specifically to apply the survey method?
Such opting out of interpretation rules could surely occur ex post,
at the time of the dispute resolution. The parties could agree and
instruct the court to rule out some interpretations or consider only
some interpretive clues. If courts are resistant, the private override
could be achieved through a stipulation of fact or even settlement.
Accordingly, the parties could agree to conduct a survey and live by
its results. Indeed, parties use surveys outside the courtroom to settle
trademark cases. A study of practitioners reports that “surveys are
used heavily in pretrial assessments and strategic decision making,”
and play “key roles in claim evaluation and are understood by attor-
neys as an influential settlement tool for both sides.”232
231 See Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design,
115 YALE L.J. 814, 838–48 (2006) (analyzing the choice of vague or precise contract terms).
232 Diamond & Franklyn, supra note 44, at 2061.
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More interestingly, opting out of the default interpretation rules
could also be attempted ex ante, at the time of entering the contract.
The parties could include in their contract an “interpretation clause”
instructing the court to interpret the text via a specific survey mech-
anism. Under our approach, such a clause would need to be drafted in
a sufficiently clear way to make its meaning comprehensible to most
laypeople who took the time to read the language at issue. While
hardly a piece of cake, we think this goal is achievable.
Courts generally follow ex ante instructions on process, especially
when they are not perceived to conflict with mandatory protections.233
For example, parties are allowed to override the default rules of inter-
pretation by explicitly drafting “entire agreement” or “merger”
clauses instructing courts to ignore other parol agreements (that might
otherwise be looked at), and courts ordinarily comply.234 Or, parties
may draft “anti-waiver” or “no oral modification” clauses instructing
courts to ignore subsequent patterns of performance in interpreting
the meaning of a term, and again courts largely comply.235 Subject to
standard protective constraints—mostly addressing asymmetry
between the parties and anti-deception goals—courts are cautiously
willing to set aside their interpretive strategies and follow the ones the
parties chose ex ante.236
Would this permissive approach extend to contractual clauses
instructing courts to utilize survey evidence in interpreting the con-
tract? In principle, we see no reason to exclude such agreements. The
entire purpose of contract interpretation is to fulfill the parties’
express intent. It would be paradoxical if, in the course of carrying out
this fulfillment mission, courts would blatantly ignore the parties’
233 See generally Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of
Contract Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 548, 609–18 (2003) (suggesting that courts treat
interpretation rules as mandatory but advocating a permissive regime instead).
234 See 1 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE:
PRACTITIONER TREATISE SERIES 182 (5th ed. 2006) (stating that “merger” clauses are
generally valid and effectively preclude the introduction of extrinsic evidence at trial); see
also FARNSWORTH, supra note 11, at 423–24 (explaining that parties can draft “merger” or
“entire agreement” clauses to alleviate uncertainty and ensure that the contract will be
treated as an integrated agreement).
235 See U.C.C. § 2-202 cmt. 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1977) (stating that
course of dealing and trade usage are to be used as interpretive tools, “[u]nless carefully
negated” in the contract). But see Omri Ben-Shahar, supra note 214, at 790–91 (noting that
courts sometimes read anti-waiver provisions as themselves subject to modification by
course of performance).
236 See RESTATEMENT OF CONSUMER CONTRACTS § 8(c) (AM. LAW INST., Council Draft
No. 3, 2017) (The requirement that courts follow interpretation guidelines that appear in
the standard contract terms may be set aside “when the standard contract terms contradict
or unreasonably limit an affirmation or promise, which is made part of the basis of the
bargain between the business and the consumer.”).
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desire to be governed by the survey interpretation method. We also
see no reason why the courts ought to respect parties’ instructions
with respect to the substantive bargain and not with respect to these
process issues. In fact, courts generally enforce parties’ procedural
instructions. They enforce choice of forum and arbitration clauses,
limited discovery, statute of limitations clauses, enhanced require-
ments of writing or other proof, and more.237
Contracting into the survey method of interpretation is an oppor-
tunity for the parties to specify not only the general preference for the
survey method, but also the precise survey procedures. Such ex ante
specification would help overcome a potential problem with the
method that sometimes plagues trademark litigation (where ex ante
agreement over litigation procedures is impossible)—the battle of the
surveys. For example, the parties may specify which survey firm would
conduct a survey and how the cost would be allocated.238 Likewise,
the parties may contract for an arbitration forum that is committed, as
part of its guaranteed procedures, to deploying the survey interpreta-
tion method.
2. Pretesting Contract Language
If parties can anticipate the use of the survey method in adjudica-
tion, they may also use it to pretest the language of their contract. As
237 A substantial literature examines contracting over procedure. See, e.g., Kevin E.
Davis & Helen Hershkoff, Contracting for Procedure, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507 (2011);
Jaime Dodge, The Limits of Procedural Private Ordering, 97 VA. L. REV. 723 (2011);
Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Changing the Litigation Game: An Ex Ante
Perspective on Contractualized Procedures, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1475 (2013); Michael L.
Moffitt, Customized Litigation: The Case for Making Civil Procedure Negotiable, 75 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 461 (2007); Henry S. Noyes, If You (Re)Build It, They Will Come:
Contracts to Remake the Rules of Litigation in Arbitration’s Image, 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 579 (2007); Judith Resnik, Procedure as Contract, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 593
(2005); Robert J. Rhee, Toward Procedural Optionality: Private Ordering of Public
Adjudication, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 514 (2009). For more skeptical takes, see David A.
Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389 (2014), and W. Mark C.
Weidemaier, Customized Procedure in Theory and Reality, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1865
(2015).
238 In opting into a survey interpretation regime, firms might be tempted to assign the
interpretation to survey companies that favor these firms’ interests, and survey firms might
reach firm-friendly outcomes in the hope of winning future survey business. Since
consumers do not scrutinize such terms in the contract, this risk is real and could
undermine the integrity of the survey interpretation method. A similar phenomenon
became widespread in consumer credit contracts, when firms included arbitration clauses
that assigned dispute resolution jurisdictions to biased arbitrators. See Dan Slater, San
Francisco Sues Provider of Arbitrators, Alleging Bias, WALL ST. J.: L. BLOG (Apr. 7, 2008,
9:23 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2008/04/07/san-francisco-sues-provider-of-arbitrators-
alleging-bias/. As it was dealt with in the arbitration context, the risk of corrupt
interpretation clauses would have to be addressed through doctrines like fraud and
unconscionability.
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Section IV.B. indicated, rather than wait for a dispute and take the
risk of an adverse outcome in litigation, a cautious drafter of the lan-
guage can verify its meaning by putting it to the same survey test that
courts would employ ex post. Michelle Boardman even suggested,
wisely, that a pre-tested proven meaning would factor into subsequent
court battles.239 This admission would spare the parties the hassle of
rerunning the survey.
There is, to be sure, an advantage in waiting for the dispute to
arise. Advance testing is overinclusive, applying to clauses that may
never get litigated or to contracts and transactions that may never be
subject to litigation. This added cost of overinclusive pretesting has to
be balanced against the benefit of reduced litigation risk. It is likely
that novel clauses, or ones that regulate large stakes, would be
pretested. The contract, recall, is part of the product. Many features of
products are pretested prior to their release to markets; why not also
the legal features?
The survey method should work well in helping contract drafters
identify “known unknowns” when it comes to contractual meaning.
Yet even with extensive pretesting, there will be some “unknown
unknowns” for firms—provisions whose ambiguity the firm drafters
could not anticipate, perhaps because of a subsequent and unforeseen
technological development. With “unknown unknowns,” it will be
impossible to design survey vignettes that appropriately test for the
possibility of a subsequent ambiguity. There is not really any method
that will reduce the uncertainty surrounding the interpretive language
of “unknown unknowns,” a shortcoming that the survey method
shares with every available alternative.
The incentive in favor of pretesting may be further bolstered if
firms utilize standard boilerplate. A trade group, for example, may
pretest an entire standard form contract, which would subsequently be
utilized by numerous parties over a long time. The balance in favor of
pretested meaning may also shift if a contract is part of a mass distri-
bution of products or services. Google, for example, may wish to
pretest many clauses in its user agreement. It could also publish the
externally certified results of its pretesting if it wanted to signal to
potential litigation opponents that it can introduce such data in the
event of litigation. This would no doubt help fend off litigation.
The combination of private opt-in and pretesting could create a
market for contract interpretation. In this market, survey firms would
compete for the business of ex post interpretation of contract lan-
guage and ex ante pretesting. These firms could become drafters of
239 Boardman, supra note 39, at 1099–101.
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 39 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
39714-nyu_92-6 Sheet No. 39 Side B      12/19/2017   13:54:27
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NYU\92-6\NYU602.txt unknown Seq: 72 18-DEC-17 7:55
1824 NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92:1753
boilerplate, offering parties contract forms with known meaning (per-
haps kept a trade secret), and could even warrant the meaning and
insure against adverse legal interpretation. Competition could go a
long way toward ensuring that surveys are done well. In this con-
tracting ecosystem, the role of courts would be to guarantee that
survey firms are not colluding with their clients and that interpretation
clauses in contracts are not used to gut mandatory protections.
VI
FURTHER EXTENSIONS AND CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
Interpretation canons have been with us for centuries. The age-
old Williston-Corbin debate over whether interpretation of contracts
should be fact-intensive or narrowly textual has not been resolved,240
and there is no reason to think it ever will be. The law of interpreta-
tion will remain non-uniform, inconsistent, and costly if it continues
along this path. Judges will bemoan, if not ridicule, the procedures
that the common law of contracts imposes on them when they set
forth to interpret contracts.241
It is time to modernize the law of contract interpretation, and this
Article attempts to make some first strides in that direction. Surveys
are revolutionizing many social and economic institutions—from
product ratings to Facebook “likes” and even classroom pedagogy.
Why not litigation too? The rationale for using surveys in litigation is
already well accepted in some areas, but the scope of the practice was
previously limited because of the costs of conducting them. The
advent of cheap, online, but still representative, survey technology is
an opportunity to spread the method. Under our approach, the results
of surveys and experiments would be conclusive with regard to inter-
pretation disputes in some contexts (where a clear consensus exists)
and relevant in others.
Although our focus here is on contract interpretation, the survey
and experimental methods we discuss may be helpful in various other
domains of litigation. In these last pages, we offer some preliminary
thoughts on their potential extension to other domains, but also a cri-
terion that we think ought to limit the scope of the method.
240 See Adam B. Badawi, Interpretive Preferences and the Limits of the New Formalism,
6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 1, 3–4 (2009) (discussing the debate between contextualists and
formalists).
241 We are reminded of Judge Kozinski’s complaint that California’s interpretation
doctrine “casts a long shadow of uncertainty over all transactions negotiated and executed
under the law of California.” Trident Ctr. v. Conn. Gen. Life Ins., 847 F.2d 564, 569 (9th
Cir. 1988).
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One possible extension is to class actions. A major issue in class
action litigation is the extent to which common issues of law or fact
predominate over issues that affect class members as individuals and
warrant treating a would-be class of plaintiffs as a collectivity with
unified interests.242 In consumer class actions, the claim often turns on
a reading of the contract, and we already showed that its interpreta-
tion could be done via consumer surveys. But surveys could also
resolve issues of commonality. For example, in some instances the lan-
guage of the contract at issue may have changed over time, and courts
have to figure out whether these modifications preclude a set of plain-
tiffs from sharing common issues. Courts considering these kinds of
cases have tended to view variations in contracts as material and have
denied class certification as a result.243
The survey-based approach offers a markedly more satisfying
way to tackle the commonality problem. Just because consumers see
different contract language, it does not follow that consumers’ under-
standing of the underlying bargains would differ in any significant
way. The Google and Yahoo experiments illustrate this emphati-
cally.244 A survey showing that respondents share common reactions
to different versions of the contractual language should override
courts’ assessments of the materiality of the revisions.
Moving beyond the realm of contract law, surveys could be used
in a variety of other contexts where a legal determination is based on
reasonable expectations—namely, on the question of how ordinary
people view a particular issue. For example, under Fourth
Amendment law, the question of what ordinary people expect with
respect to police surveillance can be relevant or even dispositive, sug-
gesting a valuable role for survey data of this kind.245 Or, in designing
various disclosure laws, the question of how people understand the
242 See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036, 1045 (2016) (discussing the
requirement under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) that common questions of law
or fact predominate over individual factors).
243 See, e.g., Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc. v. Humana Military Healthcare Servs., Inc.,
601 F.3d 1159, 1171–76 (11th Cir. 2010) (holding that significant variation in material terms
overwhelmed common question at issue); Broussard v. Meineke Disc. Muffler Shops, Inc.,
155 F.3d 331, 340 (4th Cir. 1998) (holding that the commonality requirement for class
action certification was not satisfied).
244 See supra Section III.B.5.
245 See Brief of Amici Curiae Empirical Fourth Amendment Scholars in Support of
Petitioners, Carpenter v. United States, No. 16-402 (U.S. Aug. 14, 2017), 2017 WL 3530963
(making a similar argument in a pending Fourth Amendment case on behalf of Strahilevitz
and fourteen other empirical scholars and drawing on the survey-based, scholarly literature
that examines what level of geolocation privacy ordinary Americans actually expect);
Matthew B. Kugler & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Actual Expectations of Privacy, Fourth
Amendment Doctrine, and Mosaic Theory, 2015 SUP. CT. REV. 205 (2016) (arguing that
survey data about what the public expects is relevant to Fourth Amendment doctrine).
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disclosure is sometimes (although not always) critical to evaluating the
adequacy of disclosure.246 Using surveys to resolve this question
would be a good and important step forward, correcting unrealistic
factual assumptions about the effects of disclosure, and perhaps rid-
ding us of useless disclosure mandates.
Another potential extension of the survey methodology is to the
adequacy of jury instructions. Appellate courts regularly evaluate how
jurors would respond to variations in jury instructions,247 and an
experimental literature has emerged to study these questions,248 but
the judicial decisions tend to have a blind spot as to how their analysis
might be improved with recourse to empirical evidence. For example,
in some cases where there are variations between the underlying crim-
inal statute and the instructions given to the jury concerning the appli-
cation of the law, courts seize on these variations to reverse
convictions.249 Or they hold such variations to be harmless error.250
They make these decisions without the benefit of survey evidence that
could cast light on the question of whether the alterations or omis-
sions from the statutory language—minor or major—change the way
that lay jurors understand their charge.251
Finally, it is tempting to think that if the survey method could
help interpret contracts, it could be expanded further, to resolve other
legal issues, such as statutory interpretation,252 applications of legal
246 See, e.g., KLEIMANN COMMC’N GRP., KNOW BEFORE YOU OWE: EVOLUTION OF THE
INTEGRATED TILA-RESPA DISCLOSURES 29–34 (2012) (describing the methodology used
to study how participants interacted with and interpreted the disclosures).
247 See, e.g., United States v. Southwell, 432 F.3d 1050, 1052–56 (9th Cir. 2005)
(overturning verdict because the district court failed to answer jury question as to whether
they could convict defendant if they did not agree unanimously on defendant’s sanity).
248 See, e.g., Dan Simon, More Problems with Criminal Trials: The Limited Effectiveness
of Legal Mechanisms, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 2, 2012, at 167, 173–85 (analyzing
the effectiveness of various types of instructions); Peter Miejes Tiersma, Dictionaries and
Death: Do Capital Jurors Understand Mitigation?, 1995 UTAH L. REV. 1, 10–23 (discussing
the results of empirical studies measuring jurors’ comprehension of jury instructions).
249 See, e.g., United States v. Fernandez, 722 F.3d 1, 16–27 (1st Cir. 2013) (holding that
the jury instructions, which included language that did not track the statute, were
erroneous).
250 See, e.g., Tillman v. Cook, 215 F.3d 1116, 1123–27 (10th Cir. 2000) (holding that the
jury instruction correctly communicated the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury).
251 See, e.g., State v. Paul, 104 A.3d 1058, 1059–62 (N.H. 2014) (insisting that jurors
would appreciate the significance behind the choice of “must” in the first clause and
“should” in the second clause—notably, that juries have the power to nullify criminal
convictions—when told “[i]f you have a reasonable doubt . . . you must find the defendant
not guilty,” but “if you find that the State has proved all of the elements of the offense
charged beyond a reasonable doubt, you should find the defendant guilty”).
252 See William Ortman, Chevron for Juries, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1287 (2015)
(proposing a larger role for lay juries in statutory interpretation matters); see also J.P.
Sevilla, Measuring Ordinary Meaning Using Surveys (Sept. 10, 2014) (unpublished
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standards (for example, what constitute reasonable precautions), and
even constitutional interpretation. This is not the conclusion our anal-
ysis advocates, and the arguments for such extensions have to be
made separately. Our case for the survey method is based on the pre-
mise that respondents are the right people to ask about the meaning
of a text that governs their behavior. We poll them because the pri-
mary question the court is trying to answer is: How do the recipients
of the contractual texts and other communications understand them?
Respondents are not usually the right people to ask what the
Constitution says, or how to implement a negligence standard,
because our legal system does not think that the proper answer to
these questions necessarily turns on the ordinary lay understanding of
a text.
working paper), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2466667 (arguing that ordinary meaning of
statutory language can be objectively measured using surveys).
